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THE	  FOUNDATIONS	  OF	  JUSTICE	  
Andrew	  Le	  Sueur	  




Everybody	  agrees	  that	  the	  constitutional	  principle	  of	  judicial	  independence	  is	  
important.	  In	  relation	  to	  the	  core	  judicial	  functions	  of	  hearing	  cases	  and	  writing	  
judgments,	  the	  meaning	  and	  application	  of	  the	  principle	  is	  fairly	  straightforward:	  
politicians,	  parliamentarians,	  and	  officials	  must	  refrain	  from	  interfering	  with	  judicial	  
decision-­‐making	  in	  individual	  cases.	  But	  hearing	  and	  judgments	  do	  not	  “just	  happen”;	  
they	  have	  to	  be	  facilitated	  by	  a	  wide	  array	  of	  institutions	  and	  processes	  (the	  justice	  
infrastructure),	  covering	  matters	  as	  diverse	  as	  court	  buildings,	  litigation	  procedures,	  
judicial	  careers,	  and	  legal	  aid.	  The	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  running	  of	  this	  infrastructure,	  along	  
with	  its	  periodic	  reshaping,	  presents	  numerous	  and	  complex	  challenges	  for	  a	  legal	  
system	  intent	  on	  respecting	  judicial	  independence	  and	  facilitating	  access	  to	  justice.	  	  
  
THE	  JUSTICE	  INFRASTRUCTURE	  
“All	  rise”.	  Every	  day,	  with	  words	  like	  this,	  thousands	  of	  court	  and	  tribunal	  sittings	  start	  
across	  the	  United	  Kingdom.1	  In	  the	  minutes,	  hours,	  or	  days	  that	  follow,	  judges	  
adjudicate	  on	  disputes	  of	  fact,	  decide	  what	  the	  common	  law	  is,	  and	  interpret	  and	  
apply	  legislation	  to	  the	  situations	  before	  them.	  In	  the	  higher	  courts	  and	  some	  
tribunals,	  writing	  judgments	  is	  also	  part	  of	  this	  core	  judicial	  function.	  Judges,	  and	  the	  
courts	  and	  tribunals	  they	  sit	  in,	  are	  the	  embodiment	  of	  the	  state’s	  judicial	  power,	  
authorised	  to	  impose	  criminal	  sanctions,	  order	  compensation	  and	  other	  remedies,	  and	  
adjudicate	  on	  the	  legality	  of	  governmental	  action.	  These	  core	  functions	  are	  
constitutionally	  important	  activities	  that	  give	  practical	  implementation	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1.	  There	  are	  separate	  justice	  infrastructures	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  in	  Scotland,	  and	  in	  Northern	  Ireland;	  
each	  is	  a	  distinct	  legal	  system;	  and,	  under	  the	  devolution	  settlement,	  justice	  is	  a	  policy	  field	  devolved	  to	  
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2530917 
 
	   2	  
law.	  In	  most	  countries	  round	  the	  world,	  there	  is	  a	  strong	  consensus	  that	  judges	  must	  
be	  insulated	  from	  instructions	  or	  influences	  from	  government	  or	  other	  illegitimate	  
pressures	  on	  the	  outcome	  of	  the	  particular	  case.	  Sometimes	  this	  understanding	  is	  
presented	  as	  an	  aspect	  of	  the	  rule	  of	  law;	  sometimes	  as	  a	  strand	  of	  the	  concept	  of	  
separation	  of	  powers;	  and	  sometimes	  as	  a	  freestanding	  principle	  of	  judicial	  
independence.	  	  
Court	  and	  tribunal	  hearings	  and	  judgment	  writing	  do	  not,	  however,	  “just	  
happen”.	  Behind	  every	  sitting	  and	  judgment	  there	  is	  complex	  array	  of	  institutions	  and	  
processes	  that	  facilitate	  the	  delivery	  of	  justice	  by	  the	  legal	  system’s	  35,000	  judges.	  To	  
facilitate	  the	  delivery	  of	  justice,	  courts	  and	  tribunals	  must	  be	  created	  and	  funded.	  
Jurisdiction	  (the	  legal	  power	  to	  decide	  types	  of	  cases)	  is	  created,	  transferred,	  modified,	  
and	  sometimes	  “ousted”	  by	  the	  legislature.	  There	  need	  to	  be	  rules	  of	  procedure	  
guiding	  the	  steps	  to	  be	  taken	  in	  litigation.	  Entitlement,	  if	  any,	  to	  legal	  aid,	  must	  also	  
be	  defined.	  Rules	  on	  rights	  of	  audience	  before	  courts,	  which	  in	  turn	  may	  depend	  on	  
rules	  about	  regulation	  of	  the	  legal	  profession,	  are	  required.	  The	  practical	  work	  of	  
listing	  hearings,	  allocating	  cases	  to	  judges,	  and	  ensuring	  parties,	  lawyers,	  witness	  and	  
documents	  are	  where	  they	  are	  needed	  is	  vital	  (and	  in	  many	  legal	  systems	  increasingly	  
dependent	  on	  information	  technology).2	  Buildings	  for	  courts	  and	  court	  staff	  need	  to	  
be	  provided	  and	  managed.	  Judges	  must	  be	  selected	  and	  appointed	  (perhaps	  thousands	  
each	  year)3,	  disciplined	  (occasionally),	  dismissed	  (very	  rarely)	  and	  eventually	  allowed	  
to	  retire	  with	  a	  pension.	  This	  “justice	  infrastructure”	  is	  the	  focus	  of	  this	  essay.	  
It	  is	  easy	  to	  see	  what	  an	  adverse	  impact	  a	  weak	  justice	  infrastructure	  could	  have	  
on	  the	  quality	  of	  court	  sittings	  and	  judgments	  in	  particular	  cases.	  Imagine	  a	  system	  in	  
which	  politicians	  make	  dramatic	  changes	  to	  the	  structure	  of	  courts	  without	  
consultation,	  lawyers	  without	  adequate	  professional	  expertise	  are	  appointed	  as	  judges,	  
and	  chronic	  underfunding	  delays	  litigants	  obtaining	  judgments	  and	  prevents	  many	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2.	  In	  England	  and	  Wales,	  a	  £375	  million	  investment	  programme	  started	  in	  2014,	  designed	  to	  use	  
information	  technology,	  online	  services	  and	  video	  links	  to	  reduce	  delays	  and	  costs.	  
3.	  For	  example,	  in	  2013-­‐14,	  more	  than	  800	  individual	  judicial	  appointments	  had	  to	  be	  made	  in	  England	  
and	  Wales,	  which	  involved	  processing	  over	  5,000	  applications	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people	  from	  affording	  access	  to	  the	  courts.	  Worse,	  a	  justice	  infrastructure	  could	  be	  
affected	  by	  endemic	  corruption.	  As	  Lord	  Phillips	  of	  Worth	  Matravers	  (Lord	  Chief	  
Justice	  of	  England	  and	  Wales)	  said,	  repeating	  the	  sentiments	  of	  Lord	  Browne-­‐
Wilkinson	  (a	  former	  Senior	  Law	  Lord):	  “Judicial	  independence	  cannot	  exist	  on	  its	  own	  
–	  judges	  must	  have	  the	  loyal	  staff,	  buildings	  and	  equipment	  to	  support	  the	  exercise	  of	  
the	  independent	  judicial	  function”.4	  	  
The	  justice	  infrastructure	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  has	  in	  recent	  years	  been	  
buffeted	  by	  some	  poorly	  considered	  reform	  attempts	  and	  (like	  almost	  every	  other	  part	  
of	  the	  public	  sector)	  has	  been	  reeling	  from	  financial	  cuts	  introduced	  by	  government	  in	  
the	  wake	  of	  the	  2008	  Financial	  Crisis.	  The	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  (the	  government	  
department	  responsible	  for	  the	  courts	  and	  judiciary)	  had	  an	  “extremely	  challenging”	  
settlement	  in	  the	  2010	  Comprehensive	  Spending	  Review,	  requiring	  it	  to	  reduce	  
expenditure	  by	  over	  £2	  billion	  pounds	  a	  year	  during	  the	  four-­‐year	  period	  2011-­‐15;	  and	  it	  
was	  required	  to	  find	  a	  further	  10	  per	  cent	  savings	  in	  2015-­‐16.5	  Pay	  freezes,	  job	  cuts,	  and	  
court	  closures	  are	  affecting	  the	  morale	  of	  judges	  and	  court	  staff.6	  Many	  judges	  and	  
practitioners	  are	  deeply	  concerned	  about	  recent	  radical	  changes	  to	  the	  legal	  aid	  
system.7	  	  	  
This	  essay	  explores	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  in	  England	  and	  Wales,	  which	  has	  
undergone	  significant	  reforms	  in	  recent	  years.	  It	  does	  this	  on	  two	  levels	  –	  “running”	  
and	  “shaping”.	  The	  first	  level	  (running)	  is	  the	  routine	  operation	  of	  the	  system,	  where	  
decisions	  are	  taken	  within	  the	  framework	  of	  the	  existing	  infrastructure.	  This	  
encompasses	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  matters	  (for	  example	  listing	  of	  cases	  for	  hearing,	  making	  
individual	  judicial	  appointments,	  granting	  or	  refusing	  legal	  aid)	  and	  annual	  planning	  
cycles	  (such	  as	  the	  allocation	  of	  resources	  to	  HM	  Courts	  and	  Tribunals	  Service,	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4.	  House	  of	  Commons	  Select	  Constitutional	  Affairs	  Committee,	  The	  Creation	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  
6th	  Report	  of	  2006-­‐07,	  HC	  466,	  Ev	  27.	  
5.	  Senior	  Salaries	  Review	  Body,	  Thirty-­‐sixth	  Annual	  Report	  (Report	  No.84),	  Cm	  8822,	  para.5.6.	  
6.	  See	  p	  000.	  
7.	  See	  p	  000	  below;	  and	  F.	  Wilmot-­‐Smith,	  “Necessity	  or	  Ideology?	  (2014)	  36(21)	  London	  Review	  of	  Books	  
15.	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organisation	  that	  runs	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  infrastructure).	  The	  second	  level	  (shaping)	  
is	  strategic,	  concerned	  with	  changing	  the	  infrastructure,	  which	  typically	  involves	  the	  
addition	  or	  abolition	  of	  a	  major	  new	  process	  or	  institution	  or	  significant	  new	  rules.	  
Recent	  examples	  of	  shaping	  are	  the	  institutional	  changes	  introduced	  by	  the	  
Constitutional	  Reform	  Act	  2005	  (reforming	  the	  office	  of	  Lord	  Chancellor,	  creating	  the	  
UK	  Supreme	  Court,	  and	  a	  new	  process	  for	  appointing	  judges	  in	  England	  and	  Wales).	  
	   Both	  levels	  of	  the	  infrastructure	  –	  running	  and	  shaping	  –	  are	  of	  constitutional	  
significance.	  They	  generate	  direct	  and	  indirect	  risks	  of	  damaging	  or	  enriching	  judicial	  
independence	  for	  the	  core	  functions	  of	  hearing	  cases	  and	  writing	  judgments.8	  It	  may	  
be	  tempting	  to	  think	  that	  a	  neat	  solution	  would	  be	  to	  hand	  over	  the	  running	  and	  
shaping	  of	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  –	  lock,	  stock,	  and	  barrel	  –	  to	  the	  judiciary.	  But,	  as	  
we	  will	  see,	  a	  solution	  along	  these	  lines	  needs	  to	  be	  rejected	  as	  being	  too	  difficult	  to	  
square	  with	  other	  constitutional	  values,	  especially	  accountability	  and	  the	  need	  to	  
reflect	  the	  broad	  public	  interest.9	  Running	  and	  shaping	  of	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  
also	  has	  direct	  and	  indirect	  implications	  for	  the	  constitutional	  principle	  of	  access	  to	  
justice.	  
	  
THE	  BLUEPRINT	  FOR	  THE	  INFRASTRUCTURE	  	  
Where	  do	  we	  find	  the	  blueprint	  –	  the	  instruction	  manual	  –	  for	  the	  justice	  
infrastructure?	  In	  countries	  with	  codified	  written	  constitutions,	  the	  Constitution	  is	  a	  
source.	  In	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  primary	  and	  secondary	  legislation	  and	  specific	  pieces	  
of	  “soft	  law”	  provide	  the	  detailed	  rules	  and	  requirements	  that	  keep	  the	  system	  ticking	  
over.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8.	  For	  a	  detailed	  statement	  of	  the	  specific	  norms	  grouped	  under	  the	  umbrella	  term	  “judicial	  
independence”,	  see	  The	  Mount	  Scopus	  Approved	  Revised	  International	  Standards	  of	  Judicial	  
Independence	  (2008,	  as	  amended)	  	  www.jwp.org	  	  (accessed	  10	  November	  2014).	  
9.	  On	  accountability,	  see	  further	  A	  Le	  Sueur,	  “Parliamentary	  Accountability	  and	  the	  Justice	  System”	  ch	  9	  
in	  N	  Bamforth	  and	  P	  Leyland	  (eds),	  Accountability	  in	  the	  Contemporary	  Constitution	  (OUP,	  Oxford,	  
2013).	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CONSTITUTIONS	  
In	  countries	  with	  codified	  constitutions,	  the	  major	  elements	  of	  their	  justice	  
infrastructure	  are	  laid	  down	  in	  part	  of	  the	  constitutional	  code.10	  It	  should	  not	  surprise	  
us	  to	  find	  that	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  contrasts	  across	  different	  constitutional,	  
political	  and	  legal	  cultures.	  What	  is	  normal	  in	  one	  system	  (for	  example,	  selecting	  
judges	  through	  highly	  politicised	  elections	  in	  some	  states	  of	  the	  USA)	  is	  anathema	  in	  
others	  (where	  professional	  merit	  is	  the	  criterion	  for	  appointment).	  There	  is,	  however,	  
broad	  consensus	  about	  some	  general	  abstract	  principles	  that	  in	  the	  mid-­‐20th	  century	  
came	  to	  be	  included	  in	  international	  human	  rights	  treaties.	  The	  judicial	  infrastructure	  
must	  enable	  hearings	  that	  are	  “independent	  and	  impartial”,	  in	  public	  (unless	  there	  is	  
an	  overriding	  public	  interest	  in	  closed	  hearings),	  and	  within	  a	  reasonable	  time.11	  	  
LEGISLATION	  
As	  we	  muddle	  through	  without	  a	  codified	  constitution	  in	  the	  United	  Kingdom,	  it	  is	  
Acts	  of	  Parliament	  that	  do	  the	  work	  of	  creating	  the	  institutions,	  rules,	  procedures,	  and	  
conferring	  executive	  power	  for	  the	  most	  important	  elements	  of	  the	  national	  judicial	  
infrastructure.12	  The	  Acts	  are	  amended	  quite	  frequently	  through	  the	  normal	  
parliamentary	  legislative	  process	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  and	  the	  House	  of	  Lords.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10.	  See	  e.g.	  the	  Australian	  Constitution,	  Part	  III	  (Judicature);	  Spanish	  Constitution,	  Part	  VI	  (Judicial	  
Power);	  Constitution	  of	  Ireland,	  arts	  34-­‐37;	  and	  so	  on.	  
11.	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights,	  art	  10	  (“Everyone	  is	  entitled	  in	  full	  equality	  to	  a	  fair	  and	  
public	  hearing	  by	  an	  independent	  and	  impartial	  tribunal,	  in	  the	  determination	  of	  his	  rights	  and	  
obligations	  and	  of	  any	  criminal	  charge	  against	  him”);	  European	  Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights,	  art	  6.	  
12.	  These	  include:	  the	  Courts	  Act	  1971	  (creating	  the	  Crown	  Court);	  the	  Magistrates’	  Courts	  Act	  1980;	  the	  
Senior	  Courts	  Act	  1981	  (regulating	  the	  High	  Court	  and	  Court	  of	  Appeal);	  the	  County	  Courts	  Act	  1984;	  
the	  Legal	  Aid	  Act	  1988	  (replaced	  by	  the	  Access	  to	  Justice	  Act	  1999	  and	  subsequently	  by	  the	  Legal	  Aid,	  
Sentencing	  and	  Punishment	  of	  Offenders	  Act	  2012);	  the	  Courts	  Act	  2003	  (creating	  HM	  Courts	  Service,	  
the	  agency	  to	  administer	  courts,	  expanded	  in	  2007	  to	  include	  tribunals);	  the	  Constitutional	  Reform	  Act	  
2005	  (reforming	  the	  office	  of	  Lord	  Chancellor;	  setting	  up	  the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court;	  and	  creating	  a	  new	  
judicial	  appointments	  system);	  the	  Legal	  Services	  Act	  2007	  (regulating	  the	  legal	  profession,	  in	  
conjunction	  with	  the	  Courts	  and	  Legal	  Services	  Act	  1990);	  and	  the	  Tribunals,	  Courts	  and	  Enforcement	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Beneath	  these	  Acts	  of	  Parliament	  lies	  a	  conglomeration	  of	  delegated	  legislation.	  
As	  with	  delegated	  legislation	  on	  other	  topics,	  most	  of	  this	  comes	  into	  force	  with	  little	  
parliamentary	  scrutiny	  or	  public	  controversy.	  It	  fills	  in	  detail.	  Occasionally,	  however,	  
changes	  sought	  to	  be	  made	  in	  this	  way	  do	  receive	  high	  profile	  scrutiny,	  such	  as	  when	  
the	  blandly	  named	  Civil	  Legal	  Aid	  (Remuneration)	  (Amendment)	  (No.	  3)	  Regulations	  
2014	  prompted	  an	  outcry,	  with	  Lord	  Pannick	  leading	  a	  “motion	  of	  regret”	  debate	  in	  the	  
House	  of	  Lords	  critical	  of	  government	  proposals	  to	  restrict	  legal	  aid	  in	  judicial	  review	  
claims.13	  Only	  one	  member	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  –	  the	  junior	  minister	  representing	  
the	  government’s	  views	  –	  defended	  the	  new	  rules;	  he	  assured	  the	  House	  that	  he	  
“would	  take	  back	  the	  observations	  that	  were	  made	  during	  the	  course	  of	  the	  debate”	  to	  
the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice.14	  Lord	  Pannick	  did	  not	  press	  the	  debate	  to	  a	  vote	  and	  the	  new	  
rules	  came	  into	  force.	  
THE	  CONCORDAT	  
Beyond	  the	  statute	  book	  is	  a	  variety	  of	  “soft	  law”	  documents,	  one	  of	  which	  is	  of	  special	  
general	  significance.	  “The	  Concordat”	  reflects	  the	  outcome	  of	  an	  intense	  period	  of	  
negotiations	  in	  the	  second	  half	  of	  2003	  between	  Lord	  Woolf	  (the	  then	  Lord	  Chief	  
Justice)	  and	  Lord	  Falconer	  (the	  minister	  in	  Tony	  Blair’s	  Labour	  government	  
responsible	  for	  judiciary-­‐related	  matters).15	  The	  impetus	  for	  the	  negotiations	  was	  the	  
unexpected	  announcement	  made	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister’s	  office	  in	  June	  2003	  of	  several	  
far-­‐reaching	  changes	  to	  the	  justice	  infrastructure,	  including	  abolition	  of	  the	  ancient	  
office	  of	  Lord	  Chancellor,	  a	  new	  top-­‐level	  court	  of	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  (by	  creating	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
Act	  2007	  (creating	  the	  First-­‐tier	  Tribunal	  and	  Upper	  Tribunal	  in	  place	  of	  the	  previous	  maze	  of	  separate	  
tribunals).	  
13.	  BBC,	  “Grayling	  accused	  of	  not	  understanding	  the	  legal	  system”,	  
http://www.bbc.co.uk/democracylive/house-­‐of-­‐lords-­‐27319557	  (accessed	  10	  November	  2014).	  
14	  HL	  Hansard,	  vol	  753,	  col	  1567	  (7	  May	  2014),	  Lord	  Faulks.	  
15.	  Constitutional	  Reform:	  The	  Lord	  Chancellor’s	  judiciary-­‐related	  functions:	  Proposals,	  since	  referred	  to	  
as	  “the	  agreement”	  and	  also	  “the	  concordat”	  
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.dca.gov.uk/consult/lcoffice/judiciary.htm>	  
(accessed	  10	  November	  2014.	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UK	  Supreme	  Court	  to	  replace	  the	  Law	  Laws	  sitting	  as	  the	  Appellate	  Committee	  of	  the	  
House	  of	  Lords),	  a	  new	  judicial	  appointments	  system	  for	  England	  and	  Wales,	  and	  
disqualification	  of	  all	  senior	  judges	  from	  membership	  of	  Parliament.	  This	  was	  
dramatic	  stuff	  and	  prompted	  political	  opposition	  in	  Parliament	  (primarily	  from	  the	  
Conservatives)	  and	  criticism	  from	  some	  senior	  members	  of	  the	  judiciary	  (though	  
others	  supported	  the	  gist	  of	  the	  proposals).16	  A	  negotiating	  team	  was	  formed	  by	  Lord	  
Woolf	  to	  discuss	  with	  the	  government	  how	  responsibility	  for	  running	  the	  
infrastructure	  would	  be	  divided	  between	  the	  proposed	  new	  Secretary	  of	  State	  (who	  
would,	  under	  the	  Blair	  plan,	  have	  replaced	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor)	  and	  the	  judiciary.	  In	  
January	  2004,	  after	  six	  months	  of	  behind-­‐closed-­‐doors	  brokering,	  the	  Concordat	  was	  
published:	  it	  was	  a	  relatively	  short	  document	  of	  47	  paragraphs	  setting	  out	  the	  
principles	  that	  would	  govern	  the	  transfer	  of	  functions	  in	  England	  and	  Wales	  and	  
providing	  details	  of	  the	  application	  of	  those	  principles	  to	  the	  proposed	  arrangements.17	  
Lord	  Woolf	  told	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  “In	  agreeing	  the	  proposals,	  the	  judiciary	  has	  
regarded	  as	  its	  primary	  responsibility,	  not	  the	  protection	  of	  its	  own	  interests	  but	  the	  
protection	  of	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  justice	  system	  for	  the	  benefit	  of	  the	  public”.18	  
Major	  elements	  of	  the	  Concordat	  were	  incorporated	  into	  the	  Constitutional	  Reform	  
Act	  2005	  (“CRA	  2005”);	  but	  one	  central	  aspect	  was	  not.	  Following	  sustained	  opposition	  
from	  Conservative	  MPs	  and	  peers	  (and	  some	  others)	  in	  Parliament,	  the	  office	  of	  Lord	  
Chancellor	  was	  retained	  though	  in	  a	  much-­‐altered	  form:	  the	  office-­‐holder	  was	  a	  
government	  minister,	  but	  no	  longer	  the	  constitutional	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary	  nor	  
necessarily	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  or	  a	  professionally	  qualified	  lawyer.	  
After	  the	  enactment	  of	  the	  CRA	  2005,	  the	  question	  arose	  as	  to	  the	  continuing	  
status	  of	  the	  Concordat.	  On	  one	  view,	  the	  document	  had	  done	  its	  job:	  it	  was	  a	  
statement	  of	  outcome	  of	  a	  negotiation	  and,	  once	  implemented,	  could	  be	  filed	  away	  as	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16.	  For	  a	  detailed	  analysis,	  see	  A.	  Le	  Sueur,	  “From	  Appellate	  Committee	  to	  Supreme	  Court:	  a	  Narrative”,	  
ch.	  9	  in	  L.	  Blom-­‐Cooper,	  G.	  Drewry	  and	  B.	  Dickson	  (eds),	  The	  Judicial	  House	  of	  Lords	  1876-­‐2009	  (OUP,	  
Oxford	  2009).	  
17.	  Hansard	  HL,	  vol	  756,	  col	  13	  (26	  January	  2004).	  
18.	  Hansard	  HL,	  vol	  756,	  col	  25	  (26	  January	  2004)	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a	  mere	  footnote	  to	  the	  policy-­‐making	  process.	  Some,	  however,	  take	  a	  different	  view,	  
seeing	  the	  Concordat	  as	  either	  	  “constitutional	  convention”	  or	  a	  “living	  document”,	  
which	  remains	  a	  reference	  point	  and	  in	  future	  be	  developed.	  In	  2005,	  Lady	  Justice	  
Arden,	  giving	  evidence	  on	  behalf	  of	  the	  Judges’	  Council	  (the	  official	  non-­‐statutory	  
body	  set	  up	  by	  the	  judiciary	  to	  develop	  collective	  policy)	  to	  a	  House	  of	  Lords	  select	  
committee	  scrutinising	  the	  bill	  that	  became	  the	  CRA	  2005,	  called	  for	  the	  bill	  or	  the	  
bill’s	  explanatory	  notes	  to	  make	  express	  reference	  to	  the	  Concordat,	  arguing	  “there	  is	  a	  
role	  for	  the	  Concordat	  even	  after	  the	  bill	  has	  been	  enacted”,	  adding	  “not	  every	  iota	  of	  
the	  Concordat	  can	  be	  reflected	  in	  statutory	  language.	  There	  are	  some	  matters	  which	  
have	  to,	  as	  it	  were,	  survive	  within	  the	  Concordat	  and	  one	  way	  in	  which	  the	  Concordat	  
may	  be	  relevant	  in	  future	  is	  when	  the	  court	  is	  construing	  what	  will	  then	  be	  the	  
Constitutional	  Reform	  Act,	  it	  may	  be	  necessary	  for	  it	  to	  look	  at	  the	  Concordat”.19	  The	  
committee	  was	  not	  convinced,	  reporting	  “We	  do	  not	  consider	  it	  possible,	  beyond	  the	  
provisions	  made	  by	  the	  bill,	  to	  accord	  the	  Concordat	  a	  quasi-­‐statutory	  status”.20	  Two	  
years	  later,	  a	  different	  House	  of	  Lords	  committee	  carrying	  out	  an	  inquiry	  into	  the	  
relations	  between	  the	  judiciary,	  government	  and	  Parliament	  heard	  evidence	  from	  one	  
academic	  (Professor	  Robert	  Hazell)	  describing	  the	  Concordat	  as	  “a	  constitutional	  
convention”	  and	  the	  committee	  went	  on	  to	  recommend:21	  
We	  believe	  that	  the	  Concordat	  is	  a	  document	  of	  constitutional	  importance.	  We	  
are	  concerned	  that	  the	  Concordat	  has	  not	  been	  updated	  to	  reflect	  the	  new	  
arrangements	  for	  Her	  Majesty’s	  Courts	  Service,	  and	  we	  call	  on	  the	  Government	  
and	  the	  judiciary	  to	  establish	  a	  practice	  of	  amending	  the	  Concordat	  whenever	  
necessary	  to	  ensure	  that	  it	  remains	  a	  living	  document	  reflecting	  current	  
arrangements	  rather	  than	  being	  merely	  a	  historic	  document	  recording	  the	  
outcome	  of	  negotiations	  in	  2005.	  Consideration	  should	  be	  given	  to	  introducing	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19.	  House	  of	  Lords	  Select	  Committee	  on	  the	  Constitutional	  Reform	  Bill,	  Report,	  Session	  2003-­‐04,	  HL	  
Paper	  125-­‐I,	  para	  75.	  
20.	  House	  of	  Lords	  Select	  Committee	  on	  the	  Constitutional	  Reform	  Bill,	  Report,	  Session	  2003-­‐04	  (HL	  
Paper	  125-­‐1)	  para	  85.	  
21.	  House	  of	  Lords	  Constitution	  Committee,	  Relations	  between	  the	  executive,	  the	  judiciary	  and	  
Parliament,	  6th	  Report	  of	  2006-­‐07	  (HL	  Paper	  151)	  para	  14.	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a	  formal	  mechanism	  for	  laying	  revised	  versions	  of	  the	  Concordat	  before	  
Parliament.	  
No	  such	  formal	  mechanism	  for	  change	  has	  been	  put	  in	  place	  and	  no	  revisions	  have	  
been	  made	  to	  the	  Concordat	  since	  it	  was	  agreed	  in	  2003.	  	  
OTHER	  SOFT	  LAW	  
In	  addition	  to	  the	  Concordat	  (whatever	  its	  status),	  there	  are	  other	  documents	  of	  key	  
importance	  in	  the	  justice	  infrastructure.	  Of	  general	  importance	  is	  HM	  Court	  and	  
Tribunals	  Service	  Framework	  Document,	  which	  was	  laid	  before	  the	  UK	  Parliament	  in	  
July	  2014.22	  The	  document	  describes	  itself	  as	  reflecting	  “an	  agreement	  reached	  by	  the	  
Lord	  Chancellor,	  the	  Lord	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  Senior	  President	  of	  Tribunals	  on	  a	  
partnership	  between	  them	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  effective	  governance,	  financing	  and	  
operation	  of	  HM	  Courts	  &	  Tribunals	  Service”.	  	  	  
RUNNING	  THE	  INFRASTRUCTURE	  
Running	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  covers	  routine	  decision-­‐making	  of	  various	  kinds:	  
making	  decisions	  about	  individuals	  (should	  applicant	  W	  be	  selected	  for	  appointment	  
as	  a	  judge;	  should	  claimant	  X	  receive	  legal	  aid),	  about	  managing	  work	  flow	  (which	  
judges	  should	  form	  the	  panel	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  hearing	  case	  Y	  next	  week,	  should	  
court	  building	  Z	  be	  closed	  to	  save	  money;	  are	  more	  circuit	  judges	  needed	  in	  the	  South	  
West),	  about	  supervision	  of	  the	  system	  (how	  effectively	  is	  the	  tribunal	  system	  
operating),	  and	  so	  on.	  The	  general	  characteristic	  of	  “running”	  is	  that	  it	  takes	  place	  
within	  the	  existing	  infrastructure.	  
	  	   Who	  runs	  the	  national	  infrastructure	  on	  a	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  basis?	  Who	  ought	  to	  run	  
it?	  In	  trying	  to	  answer	  these	  descriptive	  and	  normative	  questions,	  it	  soon	  becomes	  
clear	  that	  there	  are	  no	  straightforward	  answers	  for	  England	  and	  Wales.	  Mapping	  out	  
the	  intricacies	  of	  the	  system	  is	  a	  colossal	  task;	  although	  some	  of	  this	  detail	  is	  needed,	  
we	  concentrate	  on	  the	  broad	  constitutional	  questions	  about	  the	  allocation	  of	  decision-­‐
making	  power.	  A	  standard	  approach	  is	  to	  use	  the	  framework	  of	  separation	  of	  powers	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22.	  HM	  Court	  and	  Tribunals	  Service	  Framework	  Document,	  Cm	  8882.	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theory.	  An	  elementary	  and	  rather	  18th	  century	  account	  of	  this	  principle	  is	  that	  there	  
are	  three	  types	  of	  state	  power,	  each	  of	  which	  ought	  to	  be	  wielded	  by	  different	  state	  
institutions:	  executive	  power	  (exercised	  by	  government,	  in	  other	  words	  ministers	  and	  
civil	  servants);	  legislative	  power	  (the	  law-­‐making	  powers	  of	  Parliament)	  and	  judicial	  
power	  (exercised	  by	  judges).23	  This	  framework	  is,	  however,	  too	  broad-­‐brush	  to	  provide	  
solutions	  as	  to	  who	  should	  run	  the	  justice	  infrastructure.	  A	  better	  approach	  is	  to	  focus	  
on	  the	  four	  main	  models	  in	  use	  in	  the	  infrastructure	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  that	  can	  be	  
discerned:	  (i)	  functions	  run	  by	  judges;	  (ii)	  functions	  run	  by	  politicians	  and	  their	  
officials;	  (iii)	  functions	  which	  are	  shared	  between	  judges	  and	  politicians;	  and	  (iv)	  
functions	  which	  have	  been	  allocated	  to	  arm’s	  length	  bodies,	  independent	  of	  both	  
judges	  and	  politicians.	  
FUNCTIONS	  RUN	  BY	  JUDGES	  
The	  CRA	  2005	  made	  the	  Lord	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  (LCJ)	  “head	  of	  the	  
judiciary”.	  Where	  infrastructure	  functions	  are	  led	  by	  the	  judiciary,	  in	  practice	  it	  is	  the	  
LCJ	  (or	  his	  nominee)	  who	  makes	  decisions.	  The	  LCJ	  is	  assisted	  by	  the	  Judicial	  
Executive	  Board	  (consisting	  of	  ten	  senior	  members	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  two	  senior	  
administrators),	  which	  meets	  monthly.	  The	  LCJ	  has	  a	  staff	  of	  186	  FTE	  officials	  in	  the	  
Judicial	  Office,	  which	  supports	  his	  work,	  including	  “professional	  trainers,	  legal	  
advisers,	  HR	  and	  communication	  experts,	  policy	  makers	  and	  administrators”.24	  The	  
Judicial	  Office,	  which	  has	  an	  annual	  budget	  of	  £18m,	  is	  funded	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  
Justice	  but	  staff	  are	  answerable	  to	  the	  LCJ	  –	  not	  to	  government	  ministers	  –	  for	  their	  
day-­‐to-­‐day	  work.	  
The	  Concordat	  lists	  six	  aspects	  of	  the	  infrastructure	  as	  ones	  to	  be	  primarily	  
carried	  out	  by	  judges:	  oath	  taking	  –	  judges	  take	  oaths	  of	  office	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  the	  
LCJ	  (not	  a	  government	  minister);	  deployment	  –	  the	  LCJ	  is	  responsible	  for	  the	  posting	  
and	  roles	  of	  individual	  judges,	  within	  a	  framework	  set	  by	  the	  government;	  nomination	  
of	  judges	  to	  fill	  posts	  that	  provide	  judicial	  leadership	  (such	  as	  senior	  presiding	  judges,	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23.	  For	  a	  more	  sophisticated	  account,	  see	  N.	  Barber,	  “Prelude	  to	  the	  Separation	  of	  Powers”	  [2001]	  CLJ	  59.	  
24.	  See	  www.judiciary.gov.uk	  (accessed	  10	  November	  2014)	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the	  deputy	  Chief	  Justice,	  the	  Vice-­‐Presidents	  of	  the	  Court	  of	  Appeal)	  “should	  fall	  to	  the	  
Lord	  Chief	  Justice	  either	  with	  the	  concurrence	  of	  or	  in	  consultation	  with”	  the	  
government;	  the	  LCJ	  determines	  which	  individual	  judges	  are	  appointed	  to	  various	  
committees,	  boards	  and	  similar	  bodies;	  the	  LCJ	  makes	  “practice	  directions”,	  with	  the	  
concurrence	  of	  the	  government,	  providing	  guidance	  to	  judges	  on	  relative	  minor	  
procedural	  matters;	  judicial	  training	  is	  led	  by	  the	  LCJ,	  within	  the	  resources	  provided	  
by	  the	  government.	  
After	  reforms	  to	  the	  judicial	  appointments	  process	  in	  2013,	  the	  LCJ	  now	  has	  a	  
final	  say	  in	  approving	  selections	  of	  candidates	  made	  by	  the	  independent	  Judicial	  
Appointments	  Commission	  to	  judicial	  posts	  below	  the	  High	  Court	  in	  the	  hierarchy,	  
with	  a	  similar	  role	  in	  relation	  to	  tribunal	  judges	  carried	  out	  by	  the	  Senior	  President	  of	  
Tribunals.25	  Previously	  this	  function	  was	  carried	  out	  by	  government	  (through	  the	  Lord	  
Chancellor);	  but	  in	  practice,	  only	  in	  a	  tiny	  number	  of	  cases	  did	  the	  government	  reject	  
the	  recommendation	  made	  by	  the	  JAC.	  
Another	  major	  component	  of	  the	  infrastructure	  led	  by	  judges	  is	  the	  operation	  
of	  the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court	  (which	  as	  well	  as	  England	  and	  Wales,	  serves	  as	  the	  highest	  
level	  appeal	  court	  for	  civil	  cases	  from	  Scotland	  and	  civil	  and	  criminal	  cases	  from	  
Northern	  Ireland).	  Before	  the	  CRA	  2005,	  the	  top	  court	  was	  the	  Appellate	  Committee	  of	  
the	  House	  of	  Lords,	  consisting	  of	  12	  professional	  judges	  (colloquially	  called	  the	  Law	  
Lords)	  who	  on	  appointment	  to	  the	  court	  were	  granted	  peerages	  enabling	  them	  to	  take	  
part	  in	  non-­‐judicial	  as	  well	  as	  judicial	  work	  of	  the	  upper	  house	  of	  the	  UK	  Parliament.	  
Cases	  were	  heard	  in	  a	  committee	  room	  in	  Parliament	  and	  judgments	  (or	  “speeches”)	  
were	  delivered	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  chamber	  at	  times	  when	  politicians	  were	  absent.	  
Some	  of	  the	  Law	  Lords	  integrated	  themselves	  into	  the	  political	  work	  of	  the	  House	  of	  
Lords,	  for	  example	  by	  listening	  and	  speaking	  in	  debates	  on	  legislation	  in	  the	  chamber	  
and	  chairing	  non-­‐judicial	  committees	  (such	  as	  one	  on	  scrutiny	  of	  EU	  legislation).	  
Other	  Law	  Lords	  sought	  to	  distance	  themselves	  from	  non-­‐judicial	  work	  as	  much	  as	  
possible,	  uneasy	  about	  the	  blurring	  of	  lines	  between	  judicial	  and	  political	  roles.	  The	  
CRA	  2005	  ended	  the	  role	  of	  the	  Appellate	  Committee,	  transferring	  the	  Law	  Lords	  to	  a	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25.	  Courts	  and	  Crime	  Act	  2013,	  Sch	  13,	  amending	  the	  CRA	  2005.	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new	  UK	  Supreme	  Court	  physically	  and	  institutionally	  separated	  from	  Parliament	  
(though	  it	  was	  not	  until	  October	  2009	  that	  the	  new	  court	  was	  ready	  to	  start	  work).	  
Three	  infrastructure	  questions	  relating	  to	  the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court	  were	  
considered	  in	  detail	  during	  the	  debates	  in	  2004-­‐05.	  The	  first	  was	  who	  should	  make	  the	  
rules	  of	  court?	  Initially,	  the	  government	  proposed	  that	  it	  should	  have	  a	  controlling	  
influence,	  with	  power	  to	  disallow	  rules	  proposed	  by	  the	  President	  of	  the	  court.	  
Responding	  to	  criticisms,	  the	  government	  backed	  down	  and	  agreed	  that	  the	  President	  
should	  have	  sole	  rule-­‐making	  power,	  with	  a	  duty	  to	  consult	  the	  legal	  profession	  and	  
government.	  The	  government’s	  only	  role	  is	  to	  lay	  the	  rules	  before	  Parliament	  for	  
formal	  approval	  as	  delegated	  legislation.	  	  
A	  second	  issue	  was	  how	  the	  administration	  of	  the	  court	  should	  be	  organised.	  
Initially,	  the	  bill	  provided	  “The	  Minister	  may	  appoint	  such	  officers	  and	  staff	  as	  he	  
thinks	  appropriate	  for	  the	  purpose	  of	  discharging	  his	  general	  duty	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  
Supreme	  Court”.	  Critics,	  including	  the	  Law	  Lords,	  argued	  that	  this	  would	  give	  the	  
government	  too	  much	  influence	  over	  the	  court’s	  day-­‐to-­‐day	  operations.	  Under	  
pressure,	  the	  government	  agreed	  to	  amend	  the	  bill	  so	  that	  the	  CRA	  2005	  now	  provides	  
“The	  President	  of	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  may	  appoint	  officers	  and	  staff	  of	  the	  Court”	  (s	  
49).	  Until	  2013,	  the	  government	  remained	  responsible	  for	  appointing	  the	  court’s	  chief	  
executive,	  after	  consulting	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Court;	  but	  the	  Crime	  and	  Courts	  Act	  
2013	  amended	  the	  CRA	  2005	  so	  that	  s	  48	  now	  reads	  “It	  is	  for	  the	  President	  of	  the	  Court	  
to	  appoint	  the	  chief	  executive”.	  
A	  third	  issue	  was	  funding.	  During	  the	  passage	  of	  the	  bill,	  the	  government	  gave	  
the	  reassurance	  that	  “the	  Minister	  will	  simply	  be	  a	  conduit	  for	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  bid	  
and	  will	  not	  be	  able	  to	  alter	  it	  before	  passing	  it	  on	  to	  the	  Treasury”.	  The	  CRA	  provides	  
that	  the	  government	  (i.e.	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor)	  “must	  ensure	  that	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  is	  
provided”	  with	  “such	  other	  resources	  as	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  thinks	  are	  appropriate	  for	  
the	  Court	  to	  carry	  on	  its	  business”.	  This	  arrangement	  is	  difficult	  to	  square	  with	  the	  
reassurance	  and	  has	  caused	  misunderstanding	  and	  some	  ill	  will	  between	  the	  court	  and	  
the	  government	  in	  the	  ensuing	  years.	  Giving	  a	  public	  lecture	  in	  2011,	  Lord	  Phillips	  
(President	  of	  the	  court)	  told	  his	  audience	  about	  government	  pressure	  to	  make	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dramatic	  cost	  reductions,	  a	  “peremptory”	  letter	  he	  had	  received	  from	  the	  minister	  and	  
his	  conclusion:	  	  
that	  our	  present	  funding	  arrangements	  do	  not	  satisfactorily	  guarantee	  our	  
institutional	  independence.	  We	  are,	  in	  reality,	  dependant	  each	  year	  upon	  what	  
we	  can	  persuade	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  of	  England	  and	  Wales	  to	  give	  us	  by	  way	  
of	  ‘contribution’.	  This	  is	  not	  a	  satisfactory	  situation	  for	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  of	  
the	  United	  Kingdom.	  It	  is	  already	  leading	  a	  tendency	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Justice	  to	  try	  to	  gain	  the	  Supreme	  Court	  as	  an	  outlying	  part	  of	  its	  
empire.	  
The	  following	  morning,	  the	  government	  responded	  in	  the	  news	  media.	  Kenneth	  
Clarke,	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor,	  was	  reported	  as	  saying	  “judicial	  independence	  was	  at	  the	  
heart	  of	  the	  country’s	  freedom	  but	  that	  Phillips	  could	  not	  be	  in	  the	  ‘unique	  position’	  of	  
telling	  the	  government	  what	  its	  budget	  should	  be”.26	  	  
FUNCTIONS	  RUN	  BY	  GOVERNMENT	  
Most	  of	  government’s	  powers	  to	  run	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  are	  legally	  and	  
constitutionally	  speaking	  in	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor.	  Before	  the	  CRA	  2005,	  
Prime	  Ministers	  selected	  senior,	  experienced	  lawyers	  for	  the	  role;	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  
and	  senior	  judges	  therefore	  knew	  each	  other	  professionally	  and	  moved	  in	  the	  same	  
social	  circles.	  	  On	  taking	  up	  the	  post,	  the	  office	  holder	  became	  the	  constitutional	  head	  
of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  with	  that	  came	  the	  right	  to	  sit	  as	  the	  presiding	  judge	  in	  the	  top-­‐
level	  courts	  (even	  though,	  prior	  to	  appoint,	  many	  Lord	  Chancellors	  had	  little	  
experience	  of	  sitting	  judicially).	  
The	  2003	  Blair	  government	  proposal	  was	  to	  abolish	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  and	  
transfer	  government	  responsibilities	  for	  judiciary	  and	  court-­‐related	  functions	  to	  a	  new	  
post	  of	  Secretary	  of	  State.27	  Once	  the	  announcement	  had	  been	  made,	  a	  broad	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26.	  H.	  Mulholland,	  “Kenneth	  Clarke	  rejects	  claim	  of	  threat	  to	  supreme	  court	  independence”,	  The	  
Guardian,	  9	  February	  2011.	  
27.	  In	  law,	  all	  Secretaries	  of	  State	  hold	  a	  single	  office.	  Acts	  of	  Parliament	  confer	  powers	  and	  impose	  
duties	  on	  ‘the	  Secretary	  of	  State’	  without	  further	  elaboration	  as	  to	  which	  minister	  will	  in	  practice	  
exercise	  those	  powers	  or	  carry	  out	  those	  duties.	  The	  Interpretation	  Act	  1978	  provides	  that	  a	  reference	  to	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consensus	  quickly	  emerged	  that	  it	  was	  no	  longer	  appropriate	  for	  a	  government	  
minister	  to	  be	  the	  constitutional	  head	  of	  the	  judiciary	  or	  to	  sit	  as	  a	  judge.	  But	  the	  
Conservatives	  (then	  in	  opposition),	  supported	  by	  many	  cross-­‐bencher	  peers	  in	  the	  
House	  of	  Lords,	  were	  vehemently	  opposed	  to	  the	  outright	  abolition	  of	  the	  office	  of	  
Lord	  Chancellor:	  they	  wanted	  the	  government	  minister	  responsible	  for	  judiciary-­‐
related	  matters	  and	  the	  courts	  to	  retain	  some	  of	  the	  characteristics	  of	  previous	  Lord	  
Chancellors.	  The	  minister	  should,	  they	  argued,	  continue	  to	  be	  called	  “the	  Lord	  
Chancellor”,	  and	  should	  be	  a	  professionally	  qualified	  lawyer,	  sit	  in	  Parliament	  in	  the	  
House	  of	  Lords	  (not	  in	  the	  Commons),	  and	  be	  somebody	  at	  the	  end	  of	  their	  political	  
career	  (rather	  than	  being	  an	  ambitious	  mid-­‐career	  politician	  keen	  to	  please,	  and	  
therefore	  be	  under	  the	  patronage	  of,	  the	  Prime	  Minister).	  The	  protracted	  political	  
wrangling	  was	  brought	  to	  an	  end	  by	  the	  need	  for	  the	  bill	  to	  become	  the	  CRA	  2005	  
before	  the	  general	  election	  that	  year.	  The	  outcome	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  
was	  that	  the	  name	  was	  retained,	  but	  there	  would	  be	  no	  requirement	  for	  the	  office	  
holder	  to	  be	  lawyer,	  or	  to	  sit	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords.	  The	  new	  “Lord	  Chancellor”	  was	  in	  
most	  respects	  a	  mainstream	  government	  minister.	  There	  were,	  however,	  some	  special	  
features	  of	  the	  new	  ministerial	  office.	  	  
Although	  the	  CRA	  2005	  is	  completely	  silent	  on	  this,	  the	  role	  of	  Lord	  Chancellor	  
is	  in	  practice	  combined	  with	  that	  of	  Secretary	  of	  State,	  so	  that	  one	  person	  holds	  two	  
ministerial	  posts.	  Between	  2005	  and	  2006,	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  was	  called	  “Secretary	  
of	  State	  for	  Constitutional	  Affairs”,	  heading	  the	  Department	  for	  Constitutional	  Affairs	  
(DCA).	  After	  May	  2006,	  he	  became	  “Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Justice”,	  heading	  a	  new	  
department	  –	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  –	  that	  combined	  some	  of	  the	  DCA’s	  
responsibilities	  with	  areas	  previously	  under	  the	  remit	  of	  the	  Home	  Office.	  In	  this	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
“Secretary	  of	  State”	  is	  a	  reference	  to	  “one	  of	  Her	  Majesty’s	  Principal	  Secretaries	  of	  State	  for	  the	  time	  
being”.	  The	  previous	  practice	  of	  creating	  statutory	  ministerial	  posts	  responsible	  for	  particular	  areas	  of	  
policy	  (for	  example,	  the	  Minister	  of	  Transport	  or	  the	  Minister	  of	  Agriculture,	  Fisheries	  and	  Food)	  has	  
fallen	  into	  disuse.	  The	  Prime	  Minister	  has	  considerable	  scope	  for	  making	  what	  are	  often	  called	  
“machinery	  of	  government”	  changes,	  creating	  new	  Secretaries	  of	  State	  and	  departments	  and	  
transferring	  work	  between	  Secretaries	  of	  State	  and	  departments.	  These	  are	  normally	  done	  with	  little	  
parliamentary	  scrutiny.	  Changes	  are	  given	  legal	  effect	  by	  secondary	  legislation	  made	  under	  the	  
Ministers	  of	  the	  Crown	  Act	  1975.	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conjoined-­‐roles	  ministerial	  office,	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  is	  responsible	  for	  judiciary	  and	  
court-­‐related	  functions	  (along	  with	  a	  few	  other	  areas,	  such	  as	  the	  Law	  Commission)	  –	  
in	  other	  words,	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  –	  and	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State	  deals	  with	  
everything	  else	  in	  the	  Department.	  Since	  the	  CRA	  2005	  was	  enacted,	  the	  “everything	  
else”	  element	  of	  the	  job	  has	  grown	  significantly,	  to	  include	  now	  the	  large	  and	  
inevitably	  controversial	  areas	  of	  prisons	  and	  offender	  management	  (moved	  to	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Justice	  from	  the	  Home	  Office).	  	  
	  	   The	  distinctive	  nature	  of	  the	  office	  of	  Lord	  Chancellor	  –	  distinguishing	  it	  from	  
that	  of	  Secretary	  of	  State	  –	  is	  achieved	  by	  several	  different	  means.	  First,	  the	  CRA	  2005	  
and	  numerous	  other	  statutes	  confer	  powers	  and	  duties	  on	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  (rather	  
than	  the	  Secretary	  of	  State).	  It	  is	  difficult	  to	  quantify	  the	  precise	  number	  of	  these	  
functions:	  many	  pre-­‐date	  the	  CRA	  2005;	  between	  January	  2006	  and	  June	  2014,	  
Parliament	  enacted	  73	  Acts	  of	  Parliament	  referring	  to	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor,	  many	  of	  
which	  will	  contain	  multiple	  specific	  statutory	  powers	  and	  duties.	  Second,	  CRA	  2005	  s	  
20	  prevents	  many	  powers	  of	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  (those	  listed	  in	  Schd	  7	  to	  the	  CRA	  
2005)	  from	  being	  transferred	  by	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  other	  ministers	  under	  the	  
general	  machinery	  of	  government	  provisions	  of	  the	  Ministers	  of	  the	  Crown	  Act	  1975.	  
These	  Lord	  Chancellor	  powers	  are	  in	  effect	  ring-­‐fenced	  and	  require	  primary	  legislation	  
to	  allocate	  them	  elsewhere	  (so	  giving	  Parliament	  the	  final	  say	  on	  whether	  such	  
changes	  are	  made);	  but	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  also	  has	  statutory	  functions	  that	  are	  not	  
ring-­‐fenced	  in	  this	  way,	  for	  example	  those	  under	  the	  Legal	  Services	  Act	  2007	  (to	  do	  
with	  regulation	  of	  the	  legal	  profession).	  Third,	  the	  CRA	  2005	  s	  17	  makes	  the	  oath	  of	  
office	  taken	  by	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  different	  from	  that	  sworn	  by	  a	  Secretary	  of	  State:	  
“I,[name],	  do	  swear	  that	  in	  the	  office	  of	  Lord	  High	  Chancellor	  of	  Great	  Britain	  I	  will	  
respect	  the	  rule	  of	  law,	  defend	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary	  and	  discharge	  my	  
duty	  to	  ensure	  the	  provision	  of	  resources	  for	  the	  efficient	  and	  effective	  support	  of	  the	  
courts	  for	  which	  I	  am	  responsible.	   So	  help	  me	  God.”	  Fourth,	  the	  CRA	  2005	  s	  2	  sets	  out	  
factors	  that	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  “may	  take	  into	  account”	  in	  selecting	  a	  colleague	  to	  be	  
Lord	  Chancellor:	  (a)	  experience	  as	  a	  Minister	  of	  the	  Crown;	  (b)	  experience	  as	  a	  
member	  of	  either	  House	  of	  Parliament;	  (c)	  experience	  as	  a	  qualifying	  practitioner;	  (d)	  
experience	  as	  a	  teacher	  of	  law	  in	  a	  university;	  (e)	  other	  experience	  that	  the	  Prime	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Minister	  considers	  relevant”.	  In	  reality,	  these	  words	  –	  described	  as	  “vacuous”	  during	  
the	  debate	  on	  the	  bill	  –	  	  provide	  almost	  no	  political	  or	  legal	  constraints	  on	  the	  Prime	  
Minister’s	  discretion.	  
	   This	  model	  of	  conjoined	  ministerial	  offices	  is	  complex	  and	  probably	  understood	  
by	  few	  people	  outside	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  and	  the	  handful	  of	  academics	  specialising	  
in	  this	  backwater	  of	  public	  law.	  What	  do	  Lord	  Chancellors	  think	  about	  it?	  In	  February	  
2010,	  Jack	  Straw	  MP	  (Lord	  Chancellor	  in	  the	  Labour	  government	  2007-­‐2010)	  told	  the	  
Constitution	  Committee:28	  	  	  
I	  am	  perfectly	  comfortable	  about	  exercising	  both	  roles.	  They	  are	  distinct.	  Many	  
of	  your	  Lordships	  will	  remember	  the	  great	  debate	  that	  took	  place	  following	  the	  
original	  proposals	  in	  the	  Constitutional	  Reform	  Bill,	  which	  led	  to	  the	  
continuation	  of	  the	  position	  of	  Lord	  Chancellor.	  I	  happen	  to	  think	  that	  was	  the	  
right	  decision,	  for	  all	  sorts	  of	  reasons.	  The	  distinction	  in	  practice	  –	  I	  believe	  in	  
theory	  but	  actually	  in	  practice	  –	  is	  a	  very	  important	  one,	  because	  on	  the	  one	  
hand	  you	  have	  the	  Justice	  Secretary	  functions,	  which	  in	  terms	  of	  their	  operation	  
and	  how	  they	  are	  moderated	  by	  other	  colleagues	  in	  Government	  are	  no	  
different	  from	  any	  other	  secretary	  of	  state	  functions.	  The	  functions	  may	  differ	  
but	  how	  they	  are	  operated	  is	  no	  different.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  the	  functions	  of	  
Lord	  Chancellor	  are	  principally	  related	  to	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  maintenance	  of	  
the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  On	  those,	  in	  turn,	  I	  act	  independently	  of	  
other	  colleagues	  in	  Government.	  
Giving	  evidence	  to	  the	  same	  committee	  in	  September	  2014,	  Chris	  Grayling	  MP	  (Lord	  
Chancellor	  in	  the	  Coalition	  government	  from	  2012	  and	  not	  a	  lawyer)	  spoke	  strongly	  in	  
favour	  of	  the	  conjoined-­‐ministers	  model:29	  
I	  think	  now,	  given	  the	  constitutional	  changes	  that	  took	  place	  a	  decade	  ago,	  the	  
role	  of	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  would	  be	  massively	  devalued	  if	  the	  roles	  were	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separated.	  It	  is	  not	  something	  I	  had	  fully	  understood	  until	  I	  took	  the	  job.	  But	  
now	  I	  have	  truly	  understood	  in	  carrying	  out	  the	  role	  myself,	  I	  think	  it	  would	  be	  
just	  the	  opposite.	  The	  danger	  would	  be	  that	  you	  would	  end	  up	  with	  the	  
Secretary	  of	  State	  for	  Justice	  holding	  the	  Cabinet	  position.	  The	  Lord	  
Chancellor’s	  role	  is	  not	  what	  it	  used	  to	  be. 
The	  risk,	  Mr	  Grayling	  said,	  was	  that	  if	  the	  roles	  were	  split	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  would	  
become	  a	  junior	  minister	  outside	  the	  Cabinet	  whereas	  “You	  want	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor,	  
in	  a	  role	  that	  is	  not	  what	  it	  used	  to	  be,	  to	  be	  at	  the	  top	  table	  heading	  a	  substantial	  
department	  with	  weight	  around	  the	  Cabinet	  table.	  I	  think	  it	  would	  be	  a	  big	  mistake	  to	  
move	  away	  from	  that”.	  
So	  what	  parts	  of	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  does	  the	  government	  –	  through	  the	  
Lord	  Chancellor	  –	  run?	  The	  Courts	  Act	  2003,	  s.	  1	  provides	  “The	  Lord	  Chancellor	  is	  
under	  a	  duty	  to	  ensure	  that	  there	  is	  an	  efficient	  and	  effective	  system	  to	  support	  the	  
carrying	  on	  of	  the	  business	  of	  [the	  courts],	  and	  that	  appropriate	  services	  are	  provided	  
for	  those	  courts”.	  To	  ensure	  accountability,	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  must	  “prepare	  and	  lay	  
before	  both	  Houses	  of	  Parliament	  a	  report	  as	  to	  the	  way	  in	  which	  he	  has	  discharged	  
his	  general	  duty	  in	  relation	  to	  the	  courts”.	  A	  comparable	  duty	  in	  relation	  to	  UK	  
Supreme	  Court,	  is	  created	  by	  the	  CRA	  2005:	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  “must	  ensure	  that	  the	  
Supreme	  Court	  is	  provided”	  with	  “such	  other	  resources	  as	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  thinks	  
are	  appropriate	  for	  the	  Court	  to	  carry	  on	  its	  business”.	  Appearing	  before	  a	  
parliamentary	  committee	  in	  2010,	  Lord	  Judge	  (the	  then	  Lord	  Chief	  Justice)	  provided	  
insight	  into	  the	  behind-­‐the-­‐scenes	  discussions	  that	  go	  on	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  
the	  government	  in	  setting	  annual	  budgets	  for	  the	  courts.	  He	  said	  there	  were	  three	  
possibilities:30	  
...	  the	  first	  is	  that	  when	  the	  figures	  are	  examined,	  I	  come	  to	  the	  conclusion	  that	  
the	  arrangement	  is	  a	  reasonable	  one	  that	  I	  can	  sign	  up	  to–that	  is	  called	  a	  
concordat	  agreement.	  The	  second	  is	  that	  he	  offers	  a	  figure	  that	  I	  do	  not	  think	  is	  
necessarily	  going	  to	  enable	  me	  to	  fulfil	  my	  responsibilities,	  and	  I	  write	  to	  him	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30.	  House	  of	  Lords	  Constitution	  Committee,	  Meetings	  with	  the	  Lord	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  Lord	  
Chancellor,	  9th	  Report	  of	  Session	  2010-­‐11,	  HL	  Paper	  89,	  Evidence	  from	  15	  December	  2010,	  Q9.	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and	  say,	  “Well,	  that’s	  all	  you’ve	  got.	  I	  understand	  the	  difficulty	  you’re	  in.	  I	  have	  
reservations	  about	  it,	  but	  let’s	  do	  the	  best	  we	  can”.	  I	  do	  not	  sign	  the	  concordat	  
agreement,	  but	  we	  all	  get	  on	  as	  best	  we	  can	  and	  see	  what	  events	  turn	  out.	  The	  
third	  would	  be	  a	  disaster	  and	  a	  crisis	  of	  great	  magnitude	  and	  is	  that	  the	  Lord	  
Chancellor	  of	  the	  day	  offers	  the	  Lord	  Chief	  Justice	  money	  that	  the	  Lord	  Chief	  
Justice	  is	  completely	  satisfied	  is	  derisory	  for	  the	  purposes	  of	  running	  the	  
administration	  of	  justice,	  in	  which	  case	  the	  option	  available	  to	  the	  Lord	  Chief	  
Justice	  is	  to	  bring	  the	  concordat	  to	  an	  end.	  
Lord	  Judge	  envisaged	  that	  if	  the	  third	  eventuality	  were	  ever	  to	  come	  about,	  a	  new	  
concordat	  would	  have	  to	  be	  negotiated	  between	  the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  government,	  
with	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  “very	  anxious	  to	  exercise	  such	  power	  as	  is	  left	  to	  him	  in	  the	  
context	  of	  the	  parliamentary	  process”	  by	  involving	  relevant	  House	  of	  Commons	  and	  
House	  of	  Lords	  Committees	  and	  making	  a	  written	  statement	  to	  Parliament	  under	  CRA	  
2005	  s	  5.	  
The	  Concordat	  also	  recognised	  that	  the	  government	  “is	  responsible	  for	  the	  pay,	  
pensions	  and	  terms	  and	  conditions	  of	  the	  judiciary”	  (para	  21).	  A	  key	  aspect	  of	  judicial	  
independence	  recognised	  internationally	  is	  that	  judicial	  salaries	  should	  never	  by	  
reduced	  (as	  this	  would	  enable	  government	  to	  place	  pressure	  on	  judges);	  in	  the	  United	  
Kingdom	  this	  is	  secured	  by	  the	  Senior	  Courts	  Act	  1981,	  s	  12	  (“Any	  salary	  payable	  under	  
this	  section	  may	  be	  increased,	  but	  not	  reduced”).	  There	  is	  no	  legal	  impediment	  to	  
government	  imposing	  pay	  freezes,	  which	  is	  what	  happened	  for	  three	  years	  from	  2010,	  
followed	  by	  a	  one	  per	  cent	  increase.	  The	  LJC	  (Lord	  Thomas)	  recently	  told	  the	  Review	  
Body	  on	  Senior	  Salaries	  (SSRB),	  an	  independent	  body	  advisory	  body,	  that	  it	  was	  
“deeply	  regrettable”	  that	  SSRB	  recommendations	  to	  government	  on	  pay	  increases	  and	  
a	  major	  review	  of	  salaries	  were	  not	  being	  implemented	  by	  government	  and	  said	  “there	  
was	  a	  justifiable	  sense	  of	  real	  grievance	  among	  the	  judiciary”.31	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
31.	  Senior	  Salaries	  Review	  Body,	  Thirty-­‐sixth	  Annual	  Report	  (Report	  No.84),	  Cm	  8822,	  para.5.6.	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Changes	  to	  judicial	  pensions	  have,	  similarly,	  been	  a	  source	  of	  tension	  between	  
judges	  and	  government.	  Announcing	  the	  new	  scheme	  to	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  in	  
2013,	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  said:32	  
The	  Government	  recognise	  that	  although	  there	  is	  a	  longstanding	  practice	  that	  
the	  total	  remuneration	  package	  offered	  to	  the	  judiciary,	  including	  pension	  
provision,	  should	  not	  be	  reduced	  for	  serving	  judges,	  this	  forms	  part	  of	  a	  broader	  
constitutional	  principle	  that	  an	  independent	  judiciary	  must	  be	  safeguarded.	  
However,	  in	  the	  particular	  context	  of	  difficult	  economic	  circumstances	  and	  
changes	  to	  pension	  provision	  across	  the	  public	  sector,	  we	  do	  not	  consider	  that	  
the	  proposed	  reforms	  infringe	  the	  broader	  constitutional	  principle	  of	  judicial	  
independence.	  Nonetheless	  we	  have	  listened	  to	  the	  concerns	  of	  the	  judges	  and	  
we	  have	  modified	  our	  proposals.	  
FUNCTIONS	  SHARED	  BETWEEN	  JUDGES	  AND	  GOVERNMENT	  
The	  major	  area	  for	  joint-­‐working	  is	  HM	  Courts	  and	  Tribunals	  Service	  (an	  agency	  of	  the	  
Ministry	  of	  Justice),	  which	  “uniquely	  operates	  as	  a	  partnership	  between	  the	  Lord	  
Chancellor,	  the	  Lord	  Chief	  Justice	  and	  the	  Senior	  President	  of	  Tribunals	  as	  set	  out	  in	  
our	  Framework	  Document”.33	  Leadership	  is	  provided	  by	  a	  10-­‐person	  board,	  which	  
includes	  non-­‐executive	  directors,	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  officials,	  and	  three	  senior	  judges.	  
Over	  20,000	  staff	  working	  at	  650	  different	  locations	  provide	  administrative	  support	  to	  
courts	  and	  tribunals.	  The	  aims	  and	  objectives	  of	  the	  agency	  are	  set	  by	  the	  government	  
(Lord	  Chancellor)	  and	  the	  judiciary	  (the	  LCJ	  and	  the	  Senior	  President	  of	  Tribunals).	  	  
Another	  area	  of	  shared	  functions	  are	  the	  numerous	  specific	  responsibilities	  
where,	  following	  the	  agreement	  reached	  in	  the	  Concordat,	  the	  CRA	  2005	  and	  other	  
legislation	  requires	  there	  to	  be	  “concurrence”	  between	  the	  judiciary	  (the	  LCJ)	  and	  the	  
government	  (the	  Lord	  Chancellor).	  One	  such	  area	  is	  the	  system	  for	  considering	  and	  
determining	  complaints	  against	  the	  personal	  conduct	  of	  the	  judiciary.	  A	  body	  known	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32.	  Chris	  Grayling	  MP,	  HC	  Hansard,	  vol.	  000,	  col.7WS,	  5	  February	  2013.	  
33.	  HM	  Courts	  and	  Tribunals	  Service	  www.justice.gov.uk/about/hmcts.	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as	  the	  Judicial	  Conduct	  and	  Investigations	  Office	  (JCIO)	  “supports	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  
and	  the	  Lord	  Chief	  Justice	  in	  their	  joint	  responsibility	  for	  judicial	  discipline”.	  
	  
FUNCTIONS	  GIVEN	  TO	  ARM’S	  LENGTH	  INDEPENDENT	  BODIES	  
Several	  aspects	  of	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  have	  been	  entrusted	  to	  “arm’s	  length”	  
bodies,	  independent	  of	  both	  government	  and	  the	  judiciary.	  These	  bodies	  may	  have	  an	  
executive	  function	  (deciding	  things)	  or	  an	  advisory	  function.	  The	  degree	  of	  
independence	  from	  government	  and	  the	  judiciary	  varies	  according	  the	  body.	  
A	  body	  with	  a	  high	  degree	  of	  independence	  is	  the	  Judicial	  Appointments	  and	  
Conduct	  Ombudsman	  office	  (a	  team	  of	  eight),	  the	  remit	  of	  which	  is	  to	  resolve	  
grievances	  about	  how	  complaints	  about	  judicial	  conduct	  have	  been	  handled	  and	  
complaints	  about	  the	  judicial	  appointments	  process.	  It	  is	  “a	  Corporation	  Sole	  who	  acts	  
independently	  of	  Government,	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  (MoJ)	  and	  the	  Judiciary”.34	  
Another	  specialist	  ombudsmen	  service	  working	  in	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  is	  the	  
Legal	  Ombudsman	  for	  England	  and	  Wales,	  set	  up	  by	  the	  Office	  for	  Legal	  Complaints	  
(the	  Board)	  under	  the	  Legal	  Services	  Act	  2007,	  to	  deal	  with	  grievances	  against	  legal	  
practitioners.	  
The	  Judicial	  Appointments	  Commission	  for	  England	  and	  Wales,	  another	  arm’s	  
length	  body,	  was	  set	  up	  by	  the	  CRA	  2005,	  with	  the	  aim	  “to	  maintain	  and	  strengthen	  
judicial	  independence	  by	  taking	  responsibility	  for	  selecting	  candidates	  for	  judicial	  
office	  out	  of	  the	  hands	  of	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  and	  making	  the	  appointments	  process	  
clearer	  and	  more	  accountable”.35	  The	  body	  consists	  of	  15	  commissioners,	  including	  
judges,	  legal	  practitioners	  and	  lay	  people	  (one	  of	  whom	  is	  the	  chair).	  The	  JAC	  runs	  
competitions	  for	  appointment	  to	  tribunals	  and	  courts	  across	  England	  and	  Wales	  
(except	  for	  magistrates	  nor	  for	  the	  UK	  Supreme	  Court).	  A	  variety	  of	  modern	  human	  
resources	  processes	  are	  used,	  including	  application	  forms,	  written	  assessments,	  and	  
selection	  days	  at	  which	  applicants	  role-­‐play.	  The	  JAC	  makes	  recommendations	  either	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34.	  Judicial	  Appointments	  and	  Conduct	  Ombudsman,	  Annual	  Report	  2013-­‐14,	  p	  4.	  
35.	  Judicial	  Appointments	  Commission	  www.jac.judiciary.gov.uk	  (visited	  9	  November	  2014.	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to	  the	  Lord	  Chief	  Justice	  (for	  positions	  below	  the	  level	  of	  the	  High	  Court)	  or	  the	  Lord	  
Chancellor	  (for	  the	  High	  Court	  and	  Court	  of	  Appeal):	  in	  almost	  all	  cases	  the	  LCJ	  or	  
Lord	  Chancellor	  accept	  the	  recommendation	  though	  they	  have	  a	  residual	  power	  to	  ask	  
the	  JAC	  to	  reconsider	  the	  recommendation	  or	  to	  reject	  it.	  
The	  routine	  updating	  of	  procedural	  rules	  are	  carried	  by	  out	  the	  Criminal	  
Procedure	  Rules	  Committee,	  the	  Civil	  Procedure	  Rules	  Committee,	  and	  the	  Family	  
Procedure	  Rules	  Committee	  established	  by	  the	  Courts	  Act	  2003;	  these	  are	  judge-­‐led	  
expert	  groups,	  each	  described	  as	  an	  “advisory	  non-­‐departmental	  public	  body,	  
sponsored	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice”.	  Their	  membership	  categories,	  defined	  by	  
statute,	  are	  mostly	  judicial,	  with	  legal	  practitioners	  and	  lay	  members	  (for	  example,	  the	  
Civil	  Procedure	  Rules	  Committee	  includes	  “two	  persons	  with	  experience	  in	  and	  
knowledge	  of	  the	  lay	  advice	  sector	  or	  consumer	  affairs”).	  The	  Rules	  Committees	  
consult,	  submit	  rules	  to	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor,	  who	  “may	  allow,	  disallow	  or	  alter	  rules	  
so	  made”	  but	  “before	  altering	  rules	  so	  made	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  must	  consult	  the	  
Committee”.	  The	  Rules	  are	  made	  law	  through	  the	  statutory	  instrument	  procedure	  in	  
Parliament,	  which	  is	  usually	  a	  formality.36	  
Some	  arm’s	  length	  bodies	  have	  been	  abolished	  recently	  as	  part	  of	  the	  Coalition	  
Government’s	  “bonfire	  of	  the	  quangos”,	  implemented	  under	  the	  Public	  Bodies	  Act	  
2011,	  which	  sought	  to	  cut	  public	  spending,	  increase	  accountability,	  and	  “simplify	  the	  
quango	  landscape”.	  For	  a	  body	  to	  survive	  the	  cull,	  it	  needed	  to	  be	  shown	  that	  it	  
performed	  a	  technical	  function,	  or	  that	  its	  activities	  require	  political	  impartiality,	  or	  
that	  it	  needed	  to	  act	  independently	  to	  establish	  facts.	  One	  important	  body	  that	  did	  
not	  survive	  was	  the	  Administrative	  Justice	  and	  Tribunals	  Commission	  (an	  “advisory	  
non-­‐departmental	  public	  body	  or	  NDPB)),	  created	  by	  the	  Tribunals,	  Courts	  and	  
Enforcement	  Act	  2007	  and	  abolished	  in	  August	  2013,	  with	  the	  government	  moving	  
some	  of	  its	  functions	  in-­‐house	  to	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice.	  The	  AJTC’s	  purpose	  was	  “to	  
help	  make	  administrative	  justice	  and	  tribunals	  increasingly	  accessible,	  fair	  and	  
effective	  by:	  playing	  a	  pivotal	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  coherent	  principles	  and	  good	  
practice;	  promoting	  understanding,	  learning	  and	  continuous	  improvement;	  ensuring	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
36.	  Courts	  Act	  2003,	  Pt	  7,	  as	  amended,	  and	  other	  legislation.	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that	  the	  needs	  of	  users	  are	  central”.	  There	  was	  strong	  opposition	  to	  the	  AJTC’s	  demise	  
in	  the	  Parliament.	  The	  chair	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Commons	  Justice	  Committee	  argued	  
“because	  the	  administrative	  justice	  and	  tribunal	  system	  deals	  with	  disputes	  between	  
the	  citizen	  and	  the	  executive,	  moving	  the	  process	  closer	  to	  Ministers	  has	  serious	  
disadvantages.	  It	  is	  vital	  that	  oversight	  is	  seen	  to	  be	  independent”.37	  In	  the	  House	  of	  
Lords,	  peers	  debating	  the	  motion	  that	  “this	  House	  regrets	  the	  proposed	  abolition	  of	  
the	  AJTC,	  which	  will	  remove	  independent	  oversight	  of	  the	  justice	  and	  tribunal	  system	  
at	  a	  time	  when	  it	  is	  undergoing	  major	  change”	  called	  for	  the	  AJTC	  to	  be	  retained	  but	  
the	  government	  narrowly	  won	  the	  vote.38	  	  
	  DISCUSSION	  
The	  previous	  sections	  have	  illustrated	  which	  bodies	  run	  the	  different	  parts	  of	  the	  
justice	  infrastructure.	  Working	  inductively,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  detect	  some	  general	  
principles	  of	  constitutional	  design	  in	  the	  current	  network	  of	  institutions	  and	  
processes.	  
First,	  independent,	  arm’s	  length	  bodies	  are	  favoured	  where	  decisions	  relate	  to	  
individuals	  –	  such	  as	  in	  relation	  handling	  of	  grievances	  against	  judges,	  the	  JAC	  and	  
lawyers;	  and	  in	  relation	  to	  individual	  decisions	  on	  appointments	  to	  judicial	  office.	  One	  
of	  the	  reasons	  that	  Legal	  Aid,	  Sentencing	  and	  Punishment	  of	  Offenders	  Act	  2012	  
(LASPO)	  was	  controversial	  is	  because	  it	  transferred	  decision-­‐making	  about	  individual	  
legal	  aid	  applications	  from	  a	  body	  that	  had	  substantial	  operational	  independence	  from	  
government	  to	  a	  body	  closely	  integrated	  into	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice.39	  
Second,	  the	  more	  closely	  intertwined	  with	  the	  core	  judicial	  function	  (hearing	  
cases	  and	  writing	  judgments)	  a	  function	  is,	  the	  more	  control	  or	  influences	  judges	  
should	  have	  in	  the	  running	  of	  that	  function.	  It	  has	  been	  recognised	  for	  many	  years	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
37.	  http://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-­‐a-­‐z/commons-­‐select/justice-­‐
committee/news/ajtc-­‐report/	  
38.	  See	  further,	  C.	  Skelcher,	  “Reforming	  the	  oversight	  of	  administrative	  justice	  2010-­‐2014:	  does	  the	  UK	  
need	  a	  new	  Leggatt	  Report?”	  [2014]	  PL	  000.	  
39.	  Discussed	  below.	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that	  (as	  Lord	  Mackay	  of	  Clashfern,	  a	  Lord	  Chancellor	  in	  Conservative	  governments	  in	  
the	  1990s	  put	  it)	  “in	  order	  to	  preserve	  their	  independence	  the	  judges	  must	  have	  some	  
control	  or	  influence	  over	  the	  administrative	  penumbra	  immediately	  surrounding	  the	  
judicial	  process”,	  for	  example	  the	  listing	  of	  cases.40	  	  
Third,	  the	  more	  a	  function	  involves	  decisions	  about	  allocation	  of	  scare	  public	  
resources	  to	  the	  justice	  infrastructure,	  the	  greater	  the	  control	  or	  influence	  of	  
government.	  As	  John	  Bell	  argues41	  
“	  ...	  when	  it	  comes	  to	  managing	  the	  judicial	  service	  and	  setting	  its	  budgets,	  then	  
we	  are	  not	  dealing	  with	  potential	  interference	  with	  individual	  cases,	  but	  with	  
the	  setting	  of	  priorities	  between	  categories	  of	  legal	  activity,	  and	  this	  involves	  
giving	  a	  direction	  to	  society,	  which	  is	  an	  inherently	  political	  activity.	  The	  
suggestion	  that	  the	  judiciary	  should	  be	  given	  untrammelled	  authority	  in	  this	  
area	  is	  seriously	  problematic.	  
Not	  everybody	  agrees	  with	  this	  principle.	  Sir	  Francis	  Purchas	  (a	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  judge)	  
made	  the	  bold	  argument	  in	  1994	  that:42	  
Constitutional	  independence	  [of	  the	  judiciary]	  will	  not	  be	  achieved	  if	  the	  
funding	  of	  the	  administration	  of	  justice	  remains	  subject	  to	  the	  influences	  of	  the	  
political	  market	  place.	  Subject	  to	  the	  ultimate	  supervision	  of	  Parliament,	  the	  
Judiciary	  should	  be	  allowed	  to	  advise	  what	  is	  and	  what	  is	  not	  a	  necessary	  
expense	  to	  ensure	  that	  adequate	  justice	  is	  available	  to	  the	  citizen	  and	  to	  protect	  
him	  from	  unwarranted	  intrusion	  into	  his	  liberty	  by	  the	  executive.	  
Lord	  Bingham	  (who	  during	  his	  long	  judicial	  career	  held	  office	  as	  Master	  of	  the	  Rolls,	  
Lord	  Chief	  Justice	  of	  England	  and	  Wales,	  and	  Senior	  Law	  Lord)	  recognised	  that	  such	  a	  
call	  lacked	  democratic	  legitimacy.	  Even	  the	  judges,	  he	  acknowledged:	  43	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40.	  Lord	  MacKay,	  lecture	  6	  March	  1991	  quoted	  in	  Lord	  Bingham	  “Judicial	  Independence”	  (a	  lecture	  to	  
the	  Judicial	  Studies	  Board	  on	  5	  November	  1996)	  published	  in	  T.	  Bingham,	  The	  Business	  of	  Judging:	  
Selected	  Essays	  and	  Speeches,	  1985-­‐1999	  (OUP,	  Oxford,	  2011),	  55.	  
41.	  “Sweden’s	  Contribution	  to	  Governance	  of	  the	  Judiciary”	  in	  M.	  Andenas	  and	  D.	  Fairgrieve	  (eds),	  Tom	  
Bingham	  and	  the	  Transformation	  of	  the	  Law	  (OUP,	  Oxford,	  2009).	  
42.	  F.	  Purchas,	  “What	  is	  Happening	  to	  Judicial	  Independence”	  (1994)	  00	  New	  Law	  Journal	  1306,	  1324.	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...	  cannot	  overlook	  the	  existence	  of	  other	  pressing	  claims	  on	  finite	  national	  
resources.	  We	  would	  all	  recognize	  the	  defence	  of	  the	  realm	  as	  a	  vital	  national	  
priority,	  but	  I	  suspect	  that	  we	  would	  shrink	  from	  giving	  the	  chiefs	  of	  staff	  carte	  
blanche	  to	  demand	  all	  the	  resources	  which	  they	  judged	  necessary	  for	  that	  end.	  
We	  would	  all,	  probably,	  recognize	  the	  provision	  of	  good	  educational	  
opportunities	  at	  all	  levels	  as	  a	  pressing	  social	  necessity,	  but	  might	  even	  so	  
hesitate	  to	  give	  educational	  institutions	  all	  the	  money	  which	  they	  sought.	  We	  
would	  all	  regard	  the	  health	  of	  the	  people	  as	  a	  vital	  national	  concern,	  but	  could	  
scarcely	  contemplate	  the	  demands	  of	  health	  service	  professionals	  being	  met	  in	  
full,	  without	  rigorous	  democratic	  control.	  I	  do	  not	  myself	  find	  these	  choices,	  
even	  in	  theory,	  offensive;	  but	  in	  any	  event	  they	  must	  surely,	  in	  the	  real	  world,	  
be	  inevitable.	  
	  
SHAPING	  THE	  INFRASTRUCTURE	  
The	  justice	  infrastructure	  is	  always	  a	  work	  in	  progress:	  rarely	  a	  fortnight	  goes	  by	  
without	  a	  reform	  proposal.	  This	  flux	  can	  be	  illustrated,	  for	  example,	  by	  the	  changing	  
responsibility	  for	  legal	  aid,	  which	  was	  started	  by	  the	  Labour	  government	  in	  1949	  
introducing	  a	  national	  system	  for	  public	  funding	  of	  civil	  litigation	  for	  people	  unable	  to	  
afford	  legal	  fees;	  the	  United	  Kingdom	  was	  the	  first	  country	  in	  the	  world	  to	  recognise	  
legal	  aid	  as	  a	  component	  of	  a	  welfare	  state.	  At	  first,	  the	  scheme	  was	  administered	  by	  
committees	  of	  local	  lawyers	  organised	  by	  the	  Law	  Society	  (the	  solicitors’	  regulatory	  
body),	  rather	  than	  by	  government	  or	  the	  courts;	  the	  government’s	  role	  (through	  the	  
Lord	  Chancellor)	  was	  one	  of	  general	  supervision.	  In	  1989,	  the	  Law	  Society	  was	  
replaced	  by	  the	  Legal	  Aid	  Board	  (a	  government	  agency)	  as	  the	  main	  administrator.	  
The	  Legal	  Aid	  Board	  was,	  in	  turn,	  replaced	  by	  the	  Legal	  Services	  Commission	  in	  2000	  
(a	  non-­‐departmental	  public	  body	  working	  at	  arm’s	  length	  from	  government).	  The	  
Legal	  Aid,	  Sentencing	  and	  Punishment	  of	  Offenders	  Act	  2012	  remodelled	  the	  system	  
again,	  replacing	  the	  Legal	  Services	  Commission	  with	  the	  Legal	  Aid	  Agency	  (an	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  
43.	  T.	  Bingham,	  “Judicial	  independence”,	  in	  T.	  Bingham,	  The	  Business	  of	  Judging:	  Selected	  Essays	  and	  
Speeches,	  1985-­‐1999	  (OUP,	  Oxford,	  2011),	  57.	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executive	  agency	  tightly	  integrated	  within	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice).	  The	  current	  set-­‐up	  
gives	  government	  more	  direct	  control	  than	  at	  any	  time	  since	  1949	  (though	  the	  newly-­‐
created	  post	  of	  “director	  of	  legal	  aid	  casework”,	  and	  a	  large	  team	  of	  caseworkers,	  is	  not	  
subject	  to	  the	  direction	  of	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  in	  relation	  to	  individual	  legal	  aid	  
applications).	  	  
Shaping	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  is	  a	  constitutionally	  significant	  activity.	  It	  
facilitates	  –	  or	  restricts	  –	  access	  to	  justice	  and	  may	  affect	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  core	  
judicial	  function	  (hearing	  cases	  and	  writing	  judgments).	  An	  important	  question	  is	  
therefore	  who	  controls	  and	  influences	  the	  process	  of	  change	  and	  what	  methods	  they	  
use	  for	  developing	  ideas	  about	  change.	  As	  with	  running	  the	  system	  (discussed	  in	  the	  
previous	  section),	  shaping	  is	  not	  susceptible	  to	  analysis	  based	  on	  a	  basic	  separation	  of	  
powers	  theory.	  Almost	  all	  shaping	  involves	  government	  action,	  input	  from	  the	  
judiciary,	  and	  scrutiny	  and	  law-­‐making	  by	  Parliament.	  What	  matters	  is	  the	  balance	  of	  
influence	  among	  these	  institutions,	  the	  techniques	  they	  and	  other	  participants	  use	  to	  
develop	  and	  discuss	  ideas	  for	  change.	  A	  model	  of	  what	  this	  looks	  like	  can	  be	  
postulated,	  which	  emphasises	  a	  spectrum	  of	  decision-­‐making	  environments.	  Towards	  
one	  end,	  the	  environment	  is	  highly	  politicised	  (“political	  environment”)	  and	  at	  the	  
opposite	  end	  the	  environment	  is	  based	  on	  expert	  knowledge	  (“expert	  environment”);	  
in	  the	  middle	  the	  environment	  is	  mixed	  (“blended	  environment”).	  Each	  environment	  
of	  change	  has	  advantages	  and	  disadvantages.	  The	  challenge	  for	  the	  constitutional	  
system	  is	  to	  find	  optimal	  points	  at	  which	  good	  quality	  decisions	  are	  likely	  to	  be	  made;	  
this	  point	  may	  differ	  according	  to	  the	  area	  of	  the	  infrastructure	  under	  review	  and	  the	  
types	  of	  issues	  under	  consideration.	  
POLITICAL	  ENVIRONMENT	  
In	  this	  environment,	  proposals	  for	  reforming	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  are	  typically	  led	  
by	  government	  ministers.	  The	  House	  of	  Commons	  and	  House	  of	  Lords	  are	  the	  fora	  in	  
which	  change	  is	  debated.	  The	  infrastructure	  is	  assumed	  to	  be	  an	  inherently	  party	  
political	  artefact,	  in	  which	  opposing	  viewpoints	  rest	  on	  different	  values	  and	  conflicts	  
capable	  of	  being	  resolved	  through	  the	  cut-­‐and-­‐thrust	  of	  the	  political	  argumentation.	  
The	  justice	  system	  tends	  to	  be	  seen	  as	  a	  public	  service	  to	  be	  reformed	  according	  to	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party	  political	  preferences.44	  In	  the	  political	  environment,	  judges	  and	  lawyers	  have	  no	  
guaranteed	  or	  preferential	  status	  at	  the	  formative	  stages	  of	  the	  process;	  they	  are	  
merely	  consultees.	  Facts	  about	  the	  infrastructure	  are	  often	  asserted	  as	  true	  rather	  than	  
being	  demonstrated	  to	  be	  true	  through	  use	  of	  empirical	  research.	  The	  government	  
may	  have	  limited	  (or	  no)	  appreciation	  that	  its	  proposals	  have	  constitutional	  
implications.	  The	  style	  of	  presentation	  of	  the	  changes	  may	  be	  confrontational	  and	  
populist.	  	  
An	  example	  of	  change	  through	  the	  political	  mode	  is	  the	  events	  that	  eventually	  
resulted	  in	  the	  CRA	  2005.	  The	  package	  of	  reforms	  (on	  the	  office	  of	  Lord	  Chancellor,	  
creating	  a	  supreme	  court,	  radical	  changes	  to	  how	  judges	  were	  appointed,	  and	  
disqualifying	  all	  serving	  judges	  from	  membership	  of	  Parliament)	  was	  announced	  
inauspiciously	  in	  a	  press	  briefing	  by	  officials	  at	  10	  Downing	  Street	  during	  one	  of	  Tony	  
Blair’s	  annual	  Cabinet	  reshuffles.	  These	  complex	  policies	  had	  not	  been	  subject	  to	  
detailed	  legal	  or	  constitutional	  analysis.	  The	  senior	  judges	  had	  not	  been	  consulted	  
before	  the	  announcement;	  many	  heard	  about	  the	  proposals	  though	  the	  news	  media.	  
The	  changes	  were	  the	  subject	  to	  protracted,	  sometimes	  poor	  quality,	  and	  often	  highly	  
partisan	  debates	  in	  Parliament	  over	  two	  years.	  The	  end	  result	  was	  shaped	  by	  behind-­‐
the-­‐scenes	  party	  political	  negotiations	  in	  Parliament	  under	  pressure	  of	  time	  because	  of	  
the	  impending	  2005	  general	  election.	  Tony	  Blair	  candidly	  admitted	  that	  “I	  think	  we	  
could	  have	  in	  retrospect	  –	  this	  is	  entirely	  my	  responsibility	  –	  done	  it	  better”.45	  The	  
Conservatives	  were	  implacably	  opposed	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  ceasing	  to	  a	  lawyer	  yet	  in	  
2012	  Conservative	  Prime	  Minister	  David	  Cameron	  became	  the	  first	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  
select	  a	  non-­‐lawyer	  for	  the	  role	  (Chris	  Grayling	  MP,	  an	  ambitious	  mid-­‐career	  politician	  
of	  the	  type	  held	  up	  as	  a	  spectre	  by	  Conservatives	  nine	  years	  earlier)	  –	  evidence,	  
perhaps,	  that	  short-­‐termism	  and	  hypocrisy	  are	  endemic	  in	  the	  political	  environment.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44.	  See	  D.	  Oliver,	  “Does	  treating	  the	  system	  of	  justice	  as	  a	  public	  service	  have	  implications	  for	  the	  rule	  
of	  law	  and	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  independence?”	  UK	  Constitutional	  Law	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  Blog,	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  2014,	  
www.ukcla.org	  (accessed	  10	  November	  2014).	  
45.	  Tony	  Blair,	  Minutes	  of	  Evidence,	  Liaison	  Committee,	  3	  February	  2004	  (HC	  310-­‐I,	  2003-­‐04).	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The	  government	  seemed	  not	  to	  learn	  many	  lessons	  from	  the	  debacle	  of	  the	  
2003-­‐2005	  reform	  saga	  over	  the	  Lord	  Chancellorship.	  In	  2007,	  there	  was	  new	  failure	  to	  
consult	  the	  judiciary	  about	  developments	  to	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  that	  had	  
constitutional	  ramifications.	  The	  government	  decided	  to	  create	  a	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  
combining	  responsibility	  for	  judiciary	  and	  court-­‐related	  matters	  (dealt	  with	  by	  the	  
Department	  for	  Constitutional	  Affairs)	  with	  responsibility	  for	  the	  weighty	  and	  always	  
politically	  emotive	  area	  of	  prisons	  and	  offender	  management	  (previously	  in	  the	  Home	  
Office).	  The	  senior	  judiciary	  first	  learnt	  of	  these	  plans	  through	  a	  report	  in	  the	  Sunday	  
newspapers;	  they	  were	  concerned	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  would,	  as	  part	  of	  a	  new	  
huge	  department,	  become	  devalued	  as	  resources	  and	  political	  energy	  were	  diverted	  to	  
prisons;	  moreover,	  they	  saw	  risks	  of	  conflicts	  of	  interests	  within	  a	  department	  that	  was	  
simultaneously	  responsible	  for	  prisons	  and	  defending	  judicial	  independence	  (when	  
many	  of	  the	  most	  controversial	  and	  politically	  unpalatable	  cases	  involve	  prisoners	  and	  
sentencing).	  A	  parliamentary	  committee	  lamented	  that46	  
The	  creation	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  clearly	  has	  important	  implications	  for	  
the	  judiciary.	  The	  new	  dispensation	  created	  by	  the	  Constitutional	  Reform	  Act	  
and	  the	  Concordat	  requires	  the	  Government	  to	  treat	  the	  judiciary	  as	  partners,	  
not	  merely	  as	  subjects	  of	  change.	  By	  omitting	  to	  consult	  the	  judiciary	  at	  a	  
sufficiently	  early	  stage,	  by	  drawing	  the	  parameters	  of	  the	  negotiations	  too	  
tightly	  and	  by	  proceeding	  with	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  new	  Ministry	  before	  
important	  aspects	  had	  been	  resolved,	  the	  Government	  failed	  to	  do	  this.	  
Furthermore,	  the	  subsequent	  request	  made	  by	  the	  judiciary	  for	  a	  fundamental	  
review	  of	  the	  position	  in	  the	  light	  of	  the	  creation	  of	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  was	  
in	  our	  view	  a	  reasonable	  one	  to	  which	  the	  Government	  should	  have	  acceded	  in	  
a	  spirit	  of	  partnership.	  	  
Another	  illustration	  of	  change	  through	  the	  political	  mode	  are	  reforms	  to	  the	  judicial	  
review	  procedure	  initiated	  by	  the	  Coalition	  government	  in	  2012.	  Judicial	  review	  is	  a	  
process	  for	  challenging	  the	  legality	  of	  decisions	  taken	  by	  public	  bodies	  in	  the	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
46.	  House	  of	  Lords	  Constitution	  Committee,	  Relations	  between	  the	  executive,	  Parliament	  and	  the	  
judiciary,	  6th	  Report	  of	  2006-­‐07,	  HL	  Paper	  151,	  para.67.	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Administrative	  Court	  (part	  of	  the	  High	  Court);	  it	  is	  a	  vital	  way	  in	  which	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  
is	  protected.	  Using	  the	  opportunity	  of	  a	  speech	  to	  the	  Confederation	  of	  British	  
Industry	  conference	  in	  November	  2012,	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  described	  judicial	  review	  as	  
“a	  massive	  growth	  industry	  in	  Britain	  today”	  and	  said47	  	  
“We	  urgently	  needed	  to	  get	  a	  grip	  on	  this.	  So	  here’s	  what	  we’re	  going	  to	  do.	  
Reduce	  the	  time	  limit	  when	  people	  can	  bring	  cases.	  Charge	  more	  for	  reviews	  so	  
people	  think	  twice	  about	  time-­‐wasting.	  And	  instead	  of	  giving	  hopeless	  cases	  up	  
to	  four	  bites	  of	  the	  cherry	  to	  appeal	  a	  decision,	  we	  will	  halve	  that	  to	  two”.	  
The	  Lord	  Chancellor,	  Chris	  Grayling,	  later	  wrote	  an	  opinion	  piece	  in	  the	  Daily	  Mail	  in	  
which	  he	  warned	  that	  judicial	  review	  should	  not	  be	  “not	  a	  promotional	  tool	  for	  
countless	  Left-­‐wing	  campaigners”	  and	  “Britain	  cannot	  afford	  to	  allow	  a	  culture	  of	  Left-­‐
wing-­‐dominated,	  single-­‐issue	  activism	  to	  hold	  back	  our	  country	  from	  investing	  in	  
infrastructure	  and	  new	  sources	  of	  energy	  and	  from	  bringing	  down	  the	  cost	  of	  our	  
welfare	  state”.48	  Specific	  proposals	  were	  published	  piecemeal	  in	  two	  consultations	  
several	  months	  apart;	  academics	  and	  practitioners	  criticised	  them	  as	  unsupported	  by	  
empirical	  evidence	  (the	  Joint	  Committee	  on	  Human	  Rights	  concurred)	  and	  damaging	  
to	  the	  rule	  of	  law.49	  Several	  elements	  of	  the	  proposals	  contained	  in	  the	  Criminal	  Justice	  
and	  Courts	  Bill	  were	  savaged	  in	  parliamentary	  debates	  in	  the	  House	  of	  Lords;50	  at	  the	  
time	  of	  writing,	  the	  Bill	  is	  going	  back	  to	  the	  Commons	  where	  the	  Lords	  amendments	  
may	  be	  reversed.	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47.	  Available	  at	  www.gov.uk/government/news/prime-­‐ministers-­‐cbi-­‐speech	  (accessed	  9	  November	  
2014)	  
48.	  Available	  at	  www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-­‐2413135/CHRIS-­‐GRAYLING-­‐Judicial-­‐review-­‐
promotional-­‐tool-­‐Left-­‐wing-­‐campaigners.html#ixzz3IUbXriTU	  (accessed	  9	  November	  2014).	  
49.	  See	  e.g.	  V.	  Bondy	  and	  M.	  Sunkin,	  “Judicial	  Review	  Reform:	  Who	  is	  afraid	  of	  judicial	  review?	  
Debunking	  the	  myths	  of	  growth	  and	  abuse”,	  UK	  Const.	  L.	  Blog,	  January	  10,	  2013’	  );	  M.	  Fordham,	  M.	  
Chamberlain,	  I.	  Steele	  and	  Z.	  Al-­‐Rikabi,	  Streamlining	  Judicial	  Review	  in	  a	  Manner	  Consistent	  with	  the	  
Rule	  of	  Law	  (Bingham	  Centre	  Report	  2014/01),	  Bingham	  Centre	  for	  the	  Rule	  of	  Law,	  BIICL,	  London,	  
February	  2014).	  
50.	  HL	  Hansard,	  vol	  756,	  col	  952,	  27	  October	  2014.	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Standing	  back	  from	  these	  illustrations,	  what	  are	  the	  advantages	  and	  
disadvantages	  of	  changing	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  through	  a	  political	  environment?	  
One	  advantage	  is	  that	  it	  can	  provide	  real	  impetus	  to	  decisive	  change:	  if	  the	  
government	  decides	  to	  do	  something,	  it	  may	  be	  done	  speedily.	  It	  is	  also	  well	  suited	  to	  
dealing	  with	  issues	  of	  distributive	  justice	  and	  reaching	  judgements	  about	  how,	  on	  a	  
national	  scale,	  scarce	  resources	  are	  allocated	  to	  different	  areas	  of	  government	  activity.	  
The	  political	  environment	  may	  also	  score	  highly	  for	  its	  democratic	  credentials:	  
initiatives	  are	  typically	  led	  by	  ministers	  who	  are	  accountable	  to	  Parliament,	  where	  
their	  proposals	  can	  be	  scrutinised.	  	  
The	  political	  environment	  has	  potential	  disadvantages.	  Ideas	  may	  be	  
formulated	  by	  people	  without	  detailed	  knowledge	  or	  broad	  understanding	  of	  the	  
implications	  of	  their	  proposals;	  the	  range	  of	  knowledge	  and	  research	  drawn	  on	  may	  
therefore	  be	  limited.	  Of	  particular	  concern,	  is	  that	  inadequate	  regard	  is	  had	  to	  
constitutional	  principles	  –	  notably	  judicial	  independence,	  access	  to	  justice,	  and	  the	  
rule	  of	  law,	  in	  developing	  reform	  proposals.	  Expert	  views	  are	  typically	  sought	  only	  
after	  key	  preferences	  have	  been	  formed;	  when	  experts	  contribute	  through	  a	  
consultation	  process,	  this	  may	  have	  little	  or	  no	  influence	  on	  a	  government	  already	  
determined	  to	  carry	  out	  its	  plans.	  Furthermore,	  proposals	  are	  prone	  to	  being	  
announced	  before	  sufficient	  research	  and	  policy	  development	  work	  has	  been	  done	  
undertaken.	  Some	  forms	  of	  communication	  (for	  example,	  political	  speeches)	  do	  not	  
provide	  good	  opportunities	  for	  points	  of	  detail	  to	  be	  refined	  or	  complexities	  to	  be	  
explored.	  	  	  
EXPERT	  ENVIRONMENT	  
A	  different	  way	  of	  steering	  change	  to	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  is	  in	  an	  expert	  
environment.	  Experts	  and	  expertise	  come	  in	  various	  forms.	  Research	  may	  be	  
commissioned	  or	  used	  by	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  parliamentary	  select	  committees,	  the	  
Law	  Commission,	  and	  other	  institutions.	  Academics	  specialising	  in	  the	  legal	  system	  
can	  make	  expert	  contributions,	  carrying	  out	  empirical	  socio-­‐legal	  research	  (through	  
the	  collection	  and	  evaluation	  of	  data),	  analytical	  and	  normative	  studies	  (for	  example,	  
of	  the	  competing	  constitutional	  values	  in	  the	  system)	  and	  comparative	  work.	  Expertise	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may	  also	  be	  found	  in	  the	  practical	  knowledge	  of	  people	  deeply	  immersed	  within	  the	  
justice	  infrastructure,	  especially	  judges	  and	  legal	  practitioners,	  able	  to	  reflect	  on	  many	  
years	  of	  experience	  of	  how	  the	  system	  runs	  to	  offer	  insights	  into	  how	  it	  could	  be	  
improved.	  The	  style	  of	  deliberation	  in	  expert	  mode	  is	  generally	  apolitical	  and	  
predisposed	  towards	  searching	  for	  consensus.	  
An	  example	  of	  an	  expert	  environment	  can	  be	  seen	  in	  how	  the	  Law	  Commission	  
works.	  Many	  of	  its	  law	  reform	  projects	  relate	  to	  the	  justice	  infrastructure.	  For	  example,	  
after	  10	  years	  detailed	  work	  and	  consultation,	  in	  1976	  the	  Law	  Commission	  published	  
recommendations	  that	  previously	  disparate	  High	  Court	  procedures	  be	  unified	  into	  a	  
single	  “application	  for	  judicial	  review	  procedure”;	  further	  recommendations	  were	  
made	  in	  1994,	  including	  on	  which	  types	  of	  applicant	  should	  have	  standing	  to	  use	  the	  
judicial	  review	  procedure.	  Expert	  working	  can	  also	  take	  place	  within	  the	  court	  system.	  
In	  1999-­‐2000,	  a	  small	  committee	  as	  commissioned	  by	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  to	  address	  
the	  pressures	  on	  judicial	  review	  thought	  likely	  to	  result	  from	  the	  Human	  Rights	  Act;	  
chaired	  by	  Sir	  Jeffery	  Bowman	  (an	  accountant	  with	  expertise	  in	  managing	  change),	  it	  
consisted	  of	  civil	  servants,	  court	  administrators,	  an	  academic	  and	  the	  director	  of	  a	  
NGO.51	  More	  recently,	  a	  judge-­‐led	  committee	  developed	  proposals	  for	  the	  
“regionalisation”	  of	  judicial	  review,	  making	  it	  available	  at	  High	  Court	  centres	  outside	  
London.52	  
On	  a	  larger	  scale,	  a	  paradigm	  example	  of	  shaping	  through	  an	  expert	  
environment	  was	  the	  complete	  overhaul	  of	  thinking	  about	  civil	  procedure	  rules	  that	  
took	  place	  between	  1994	  and	  1999.53	  Although	  the	  reform	  process	  was	  initiated	  by	  
government,	  the	  development	  work	  was	  left	  to	  Lord	  Woolf	  (the	  Master	  of	  the	  Rolls).	  
In	  a	  two-­‐stage	  inquiry,	  Lord	  Woolf	  worked	  with	  a	  team	  of	  five	  “assessors”	  (members	  of	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51.	  See	  T.	  Cornford	  and	  M.	  Sunkin,	  “The	  Bowman	  Report,	  access	  and	  the	  recent	  reforms	  of	  the	  judicial	  
review	  procedure”	  [2001]	  Public	  Law	  11.	  
52.	  S.	  Nason	  and	  M.	  Sunkin,	  “The	  Regionalisation	  of	  Judicial	  Review:	  Constitutional	  Authority,	  Access	  to	  
Justice	  and	  Legal	  Services	  in	  Public	  Law”	  (2013)	  76(2)	  Modern	  Law	  Review	  223.	  
53.	  For	  a	  critical	  account,	  see	  J.	  Sorabji,	  English	  Civil	  Justice	  after	  the	  Woolf	  and	  Jackson	  Reforms:	  A	  
critical	  analysis	  (Cambridge	  University	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  Cambridge,	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the	  judiciary	  and	  the	  legal	  profession),	  an	  academic	  consultant	  and	  a	  consultant	  on	  
information	  technology.	  Several	  academics	  were	  commissioned	  to	  undertake	  original	  
research.	  The	  inquiry	  team	  visited	  four	  overseas	  jurisdictions	  for	  comparative	  studies.	  
The	  procedural	  reforms	  were	  implemented	  by	  the	  Civil	  Procedure	  Act	  1997	  and	  the	  
Civil	  Procedure	  Rules,	  neither	  of	  which	  caused	  any	  significant	  party	  political	  
controversy	  in	  Parliament.	  
Another	  notable	  illustration	  of	  large-­‐scale	  change	  through	  an	  expert	  
environment	  was	  the	  comprehensive	  restructuring	  of	  the	  tribunal	  system.	  In	  2000,	  the	  
government	  appointed	  Sir	  Andrew	  Leggatt	  (a	  Court	  of	  Appeal	  judge)	  “to	  review	  the	  
delivery	  of	  justice	  through	  tribunals	  other	  than	  ordinary	  courts	  of	  law”;	  he	  worked	  
with	  a	  retired	  civil	  servant	  to	  produce	  a	  detailed	  analysis	  and	  far-­‐reaching	  
recommendations	  on	  the	  changes	  that	  needed	  to	  be	  made.	  These	  included	  reducing	  
the	  number	  of	  tribunals	  from	  over	  70	  to	  two	  (the	  First-­‐tier	  Tribunal	  and	  the	  Upper	  
Tribunal).	  The	  government	  followed	  best-­‐practice	  in	  publishing	  a	  draft	  bill	  to	  
implement	  the	  recommendations	  but	  this	  had	  so	  little	  political	  resonance	  that	  no	  
parliamentary	  committee	  was	  interested	  in	  scrutinising	  it.	  The	  Tribunals,	  Courts	  and	  
Enforcement	  Act	  2007	  reached	  the	  statute	  book	  generating	  no	  notable	  party	  political	  
controversy.	  
In	  some	  contexts,	  the	  power	  of	  experts	  has	  been	  criticised	  and	  the	  limits	  of	  
their	  role	  debated.	  Writing	  about	  the	  dominance	  of	  experts	  (a	  “technocracy”)	  in	  how	  
the	  European	  Union	  develops	  policy	  ideas,	  it	  has	  been	  suggested54	  
“The	  technocrat	  believes	  that	  rational	  analysis	  and	  scientific	  examination	  of	  the	  
facts	  will	  bring	  about	  unanimous	  consensus	  on	  policy	  solutions.	  By	  contrast	  the	  
technocrat	  feels	  uneasy	  under	  conditions	  of	  political	  conflict,	  ideological	  
debates,	  and	  controversies	  on	  distributive	  issues	  of	  social	  justice.	  
So,	  some	  questions	  about	  the	  shaping	  of	  justice	  infrastructure	  cannot	  satisfactorily	  be	  
solved	  by	  experts	  and	  expert	  knowledge	  alone.	  These	  include,	  for	  example,	  whether	  it	  
would	  be	  beneficial	  for	  the	  UK	  to	  withdraw	  from	  the	  European	  Union	  and	  European	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  C.	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  politics	  of	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Convention	  on	  Human	  Rights	  (points	  of	  deep	  political	  conflict)	  or	  what	  proportion	  of	  
GDP	  should	  be	  allocated	  to	  fund	  legal	  aid	  (a	  distribute	  issue).	  There	  are	  other	  possible	  
limitations	  and	  disadvantages	  of	  an	  expert	  environment.	  Expert	  working	  may	  be	  
regarded	  as	  undemocratic:	  ideas	  may	  emerge	  from	  people	  who	  are	  unelected	  and	  
unaccountable.	  Moreover,	  if	  there	  is	  a	  disconnection	  between	  the	  priorities	  of	  
government	  and	  those	  of	  experts,	  proposals	  developed	  through	  expert	  working	  (for	  
example,	  by	  the	  Law	  Commission)	  may	  lie	  on	  the	  shelf,	  unimplemented.	  In	  some	  
situations,	  it	  may	  be	  difficult	  to	  disentangle	  expertise	  from	  self-­‐interest,	  an	  accusation	  
levelled	  at	  the	  legal	  profession	  when	  it	  seeks	  to	  influence	  justice	  infrastructure	  
reforms.	  For	  example,	  in	  June	  2013	  a	  government	  minister	  was	  reported	  as	  saying:	  
“‘Let’s	  not	  kid	  ourselves.	  We	  are	  in	  a	  wage	  negotiation,’	  Lord	  McNally	  warned	  lawyers	  
this	  week	  at	  the	  Bar	  Council’s	  Legal	  Aid	  Question	  Time	  event	  at	  Westminster.	  ‘You	  
have	  a	  vested	  interest	  in	  this	  outcome.	  To	  deny	  that,	  I	  think,	  is	  absurd’“.55	  
BLENDED	  ENVIRONMENT	  
The	  political	  and	  expert	  environments	  for	  bringing	  about	  reform	  of	  the	  justice	  
infrastructure	  represent	  points	  at	  the	  extreme	  ends	  of	  a	  spectrum	  of	  styles	  of	  decision-­‐
making.	  Between	  these	  points,	  there	  are	  ways	  of	  working	  that	  blend	  politicisation	  and	  
expertise.	  	  
Blended	  environments	  may	  be	  located	  within	  institutions.	  The	  government	  
department	  responsible	  for	  judiciary-­‐related	  and	  court	  matters,	  was	  in	  the	  past,	  led	  by	  
people	  who	  were	  experts	  in	  the	  sense	  that	  they	  had	  insider-­‐knowledge	  of	  law	  and	  the	  
legal	  system.	  The	  department	  was	  known	  successively	  as	  the	  “Lord	  Chancellor’s	  
Department”	  (1885-­‐2003),	  “the	  Department	  for	  Constitutional	  Affairs”	  (2003-­‐2007),	  
and	  latterly	  “the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice”.	  A	  government	  department	  is	  led	  by	  a	  politically	  
neutral	  civil	  servant	  –	  the	  permanent	  secretary	  –	  who	  remains	  in	  post	  even	  if	  the	  
political	  party	  in	  government	  changes	  after	  a	  general	  election.	  From	  the	  19th	  century	  
until	  1997,	  it	  was	  a	  requirement	  that	  the	  permanent	  secretary	  in	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor’s	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Department	  was	  a	  qualified	  legal	  professional.	  As	  one	  commentator	  wrote	  in	  the	  late	  
19th	  century:56	  	  
“It	  probably	  owes	  its	  statutory	  existence	  to	  a	  wise	  reform	  initiated	  by	  Lord	  
Selborne,	  who	  made	  the	  office	  of	  Principal	  Secretary	  to	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  a	  
permanent	  one.	  The	  obvious	  object	  of	  this	  reform	  was	  to	  give	  some	  chance	  of	  
continuity	  to	  the	  legal	  policy	  of	  successive	  Lord	  Chancellors,	  and	  to	  create	  what	  
might	  be	  the	  nucleus	  of	  a	  department	  of	  Law	  and	  Justice.	  Any	  one	  acquainted	  
with	  the	  working	  of	  a	  public	  office	  must	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  wholesale	  confusion	  
which	  would	  result	  if	  the	  staff	  was	  changed	  with	  every	  change	  of	  government.	  
The	  hitherto	  backward	  state	  of	  all	  non-­‐contentious	  law	  reform	  in	  this	  country	  
has	  probably	  been	  due	  in	  no	  small	  degree	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  body	  of	  
permanent	  officials	  charged	  with	  its	  supervision.	  	  
The	  end	  of	  the	  lawyer-­‐as-­‐permanent-­‐secretary	  requirement	  in	  1997	  came	  about	  in	  
consequence	  of	  the	  growth	  of	  the	  department;	  legal	  expertise	  was	  no	  longer	  regarded	  
as	  the	  most	  important	  –	  or	  even	  particularly	  relevant	  –	  attribute	  of	  the	  most	  senior	  
official.	  Legal	  advice	  –	  and	  sensitivity	  to	  constitutional	  values	  closely	  associated	  with	  
the	  legal	  system	  –	  were,	  it	  was	  thought,	  available	  from	  other	  lawyers	  within	  the	  
department.	  There	  is	  a	  perception	  that,	  in	  recently	  years,	  the	  quality	  of	  legal	  advice	  
and	  sensitivity	  in	  the	  department	  has	  diminished.	  This	  view	  is,	  however,	  contested	  by	  
officials.	  In	  evidence	  to	  a	  House	  of	  Lords	  committee	  in	  October	  2014,	  Rosemary	  
Davies,	  Legal	  Director,	  Ministry	  of	  Justice,	  said57	  
It	  does	  slightly	  worry	  me	  that	  there	  is	  a	  perception	  that	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  is	  
not	  getting	  the	  quality	  of	  legal	  advice	  that	  he	  used	  to	  get	  and	  perhaps	  there	  is	  
an	  issue	  about	  visibility	  that	  we	  should	  think	  about.	  There	  are	  60	  lawyers	  in	  the	  
in-­‐house	  public	  law	  advisory	  team,	  two	  legal	  directors	  and	  seven	  other	  senior	  
Civil	  Service	  lawyers.	  For	  example,	  the	  lawyer	  responsible	  for	  the	  team	  advising	  
on	  the	  judiciary	  and	  courts	  is	  about	  to	  retire,	  but	  he	  has	  been	  in	  the	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department	  and	  its	  predecessors	  for	  I	  think	  38	  years.	  Likewise,	  the	  lawyer	  
responsible	  for	  the	  judicial	  review	  reforms	  has	  been	  in	  the	  department	  for	  
something	  like	  27	  years.	  I	  am	  not	  quite	  sure	  where	  this	  perception	  has	  come	  
from	  that	  everybody	  has	  gone.	  Obviously,	  there	  are	  lots	  of	  new	  people	  and	  
people	  do	  move	  around–and	  generally	  that	  is	  a	  good	  thing	  –	  but	  there	  is	  no	  
shortage	  of	  continuity.	  
As	  discussed	  above,	  the	  professional	  background	  of	  Lord	  Chancellors	  has	  also	  
changed.	  Since	  the	  CRA	  2005	  it	  has	  been	  possible	  for	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  to	  appoint	  
somebody	  with	  no	  legal	  background	  as	  the	  minister	  responsible	  for	  judiciary	  and	  
court-­‐related	  matters;	  this	  possibility	  was	  made	  real	  with	  David	  Cameron’s	  
appointment	  of	  Chris	  Grayling	  MP	  to	  the	  role	  in	  September	  2012.	  A	  history	  graduate,	  
Grayling	  worked	  as	  a	  television	  producer	  and	  management	  consultant	  before	  
becoming	  an	  MP.	  As	  an	  opposition	  MP,	  he	  developed	  a	  reputation	  for	  strongly	  
confrontational	  questioning	  of	  the	  government	  (described	  by	  some	  journalists	  as	  “an	  
attack	  dog”	  style).	  The	  reason	  given	  by	  the	  Labour	  government	  in	  2005	  for	  abandoning	  
the	  requirement	  that	  Lord	  Chancellors	  be	  lawyers	  was	  that	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  role	  had	  
changed	  and	  enlarged	  so	  that	  skills	  at	  political	  leadership	  to	  “deliver”	  policies	  had	  
become	  much	  more	  important	  than	  in	  the	  past;	  such	  skills	  were	  not	  necessarily	  best	  
found	  among	  politicians	  with	  legal	  backgrounds;	  and	  the	  Prime	  Minister	  should	  
therefore	  have	  a	  broad	  discretion	  to	  select	  the	  best	  person	  for	  the	  job.	  At	  the	  time,	  
Conservatives	  in	  Parliament	  argued	  that	  a	  lawyer	  (preferably	  a	  senior	  one	  in	  the	  House	  
of	  Lords,	  rather	  than	  the	  House	  of	  Commons)	  would	  always	  be	  better	  equipped	  to	  
carry	  out	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor’s	  functions	  as	  the	  link-­‐pin	  between	  government	  and	  the	  
judiciary,	  to	  defend	  judicial	  independence	  within	  government,	  and	  to	  act	  as	  a	  guardian	  
of	  the	  rule	  of	  law	  across	  government.	  Ten	  years	  later,	  the	  (Conservative)	  Lord	  
Chancellor	  Chris	  Grayling	  MP	  told	  a	  parliamentary	  committee	  
My	  view	  is	  that	  it	  is	  a	  positive	  benefit	  for	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  not	  to	  be	  a	  
lawyer.	  The	  reason	  I	  say	  that	  is,	  certainly	  at	  this	  moment	  in	  time,	  when	  we	  are	  
having	  to	  take	  and	  would	  be	  taking	  difficult	  decisions	  [about	  reducing	  public	  
spending]	  regardless	  of	  the	  situation,	  if	  we	  had	  a	  distinguished	  member	  of	  the	  
House	  of	  Lords	  occupying	  the	  traditional	  role	  of	  Lord	  Chancellor	  overseeing	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the	  courts	  today,	  there	  would	  still	  be	  the	  same	  financial	  pressures	  that	  my	  
department	  and	  my	  team	  are	  currently	  facing.	  I	  think	  that	  not	  being	  a	  lawyer	  
gives	  you	  the	  ability	  to	  take	  a	  dispassionate	  view:	  not	  from	  one	  side	  of	  the	  legal	  
profession	  or	  the	  other,	  not	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  Bar,	  not	  from	  the	  
perspective	  of	  the	  solicitors’	  profession	  and	  not	  from	  the	  perspective	  of	  the	  
legal	  executives.	  As	  long	  as	  you	  take	  very	  seriously	  the	  duty	  to	  uphold	  the	  
principles	  I	  talked	  about	  earlier	  –	  uphold	  the	  independence	  of	  the	  judiciary,	  
uphold	  the	  independence	  of	  our	  courts	  –	  I	  think	  there	  are	  benefits	  in	  not	  
having	  a	  lawyer.	  It	  does	  not	  mean	  a	  lawyer	  cannot	  do	  the	  job,	  but	  it	  is	  really	  
important	  to	  say	  I	  think	  there	  are	  benefits	  to	  having	  a	  non-­‐lawyer	  in	  the	  job	  as	  
well.	  
Whatever	  the	  merits	  of	  moving	  from	  a	  requirement	  for	  both	  the	  permanent	  secretary	  
and	  the	  government	  minister	  to	  be	  lawyers	  to	  a	  situation	  where	  neither	  is	  a	  lawyer,	  it	  
is	  clear	  that	  the	  government	  department	  responsible	  for	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  has	  
become	  in	  important	  respects	  a	  less	  blended	  environment	  than	  previously.	  
Blending	  of	  political	  and	  expert	  environments	  can,	  however,	  be	  seen	  to	  be	  
thriving	  elsewhere	  in	  the	  system.	  In	  Parliament,	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  Constitution	  
Committee	  has	  grown	  into	  a	  significant	  institution	  connecting	  politics,	  law,	  and	  the	  
judiciary.	  The	  committee	  has	  produced	  several	  reports	  on	  aspects	  of	  the	  justice	  
infrastructure	  and	  holds	  annual	  meetings	  with	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  and	  LCJ.	  Since	  its	  
creation	  in	  2001,	  the	  committee	  (whose	  membership	  is	  broadly	  reflective	  of	  the	  
political	  composition	  of	  the	  House	  of	  Lords	  as	  a	  whole)	  has	  included	  retired	  judges	  
(Lord	  Woolf),	  a	  former	  Lord	  Chancellor	  (Lord	  Irvine),	  former	  Attorney	  Generals,	  and	  
senior	  members	  of	  the	  legal	  profession.	  Expertise	  is	  also	  brought	  into	  its	  work	  through	  
a	  legal	  adviser	  (	  all	  have	  been	  senior	  academics),	  specialist	  advisers	  appointed	  to	  assist	  
with	  particular	  inquiries,	  and	  experts	  who	  contribute	  written	  and	  oral	  evidence	  to	  the	  
committee’s	  inquiries.58	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
58.	  See	  further	  A.	  Le	  Sueur	  and	  J.	  Simson	  Caird,	  “The	  House	  of	  Lords	  Select	  Committee	  on	  the	  
Constitution”,	  ch.11	  in	  A.	  Horne,	  G.	  Drewry,	  and	  D.	  Oliver	  (eds),	  Parliament	  and	  the	  Law	  (Oxford,	  Hart	  
Publishing,	  2013).	  
 	   36	  
Blended	  working	  may	  also	  take	  place	  more	  informally	  outside	  institutions	  
where	  there	  is	  a	  predisposition	  by	  politicians	  to	  involve	  people	  with	  expertise	  at	  a	  
formative	  stage	  of	  their	  thinking.	  An	  illustration	  of	  this	  is	  an	  initiative	  of	  the	  shadow	  
Lord	  Chancellor	  Sadiq	  Khan	  MP	  to	  invite	  Sir	  Geoffrey	  Bindman	  (a	  leading	  solicitor	  
with	  expertise	  in	  public	  law)	  and	  Karon	  Monaghan	  QC	  (a	  barrister	  and	  author	  on	  
equality	  law)	  to	  lead	  a	  review	  of	  how	  to	  improve	  diversity	  in	  the	  judiciary.	  They	  were	  
encouraged	  to	  consider	  more	  radical	  measures	  such	  as	  positive	  discrimination	  and	  
gender	  quotas;	  academics	  contributed	  to	  a	  private	  seminar	  on	  the	  legality	  and	  
feasibility	  of	  gender	  quotas.59	  
DISCUSSION	  
The	  illustrations	  outlined	  above	  show	  how	  policies	  to	  change	  the	  justice	  infrastructure	  
are	  developed	  in	  a	  variety	  of	  different	  environments.	  A	  blended	  environment	  which	  
captures	  the	  strengths	  of	  political	  and	  expert	  methods	  of	  working,	  and	  minimizes	  
their	  weakness,	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  the	  best	  way	  of	  reaching	  considered,	  evidence-­‐based	  and	  
(so	  far	  as	  possible)	  consensus	  on	  many	  types	  of	  reform	  question.	  A	  predisposition	  to	  
blended	  environments	  can	  be	  encouraged	  if	  the	  Lord	  Chancellor	  were	  required	  to	  
apply	  three	  presumptions	  when	  contemplating	  change.	  	  
First,	  the	  more	  directly	  a	  proposed	  infrastructure	  change	  affects	  the	  
constitutional	  principles	  of	  judicial	  independence	  and	  access	  to	  justice,	  the	  stronger	  
the	  presumption	  that	  detailed	  analysis	  of	  the	  problem	  and	  recommendations	  are	  
developed	  by	  an	  expert	  body	  –	  an	  ad	  hoc	  one	  (Woolf,	  Leggett,	  Bowman),	  the	  Law	  
Commission,	  or	  (for	  truly	  landmark	  change)	  a	  Royal	  Commission.	  A	  decision	  to	  
develop	  policy	  “in	  house”	  within	  the	  Ministry	  of	  Justice	  (such	  as	  the	  recent	  judicial	  
review	  reforms)	  or	  other	  part	  of	  government	  (10	  Downing	  Street	  in	  relation	  to	  
decisions	  that	  led	  to	  the	  CRA	  2005)	  should	  be	  carefully	  justified.	  Second,	  there	  should	  
be	  a	  strong	  presumption	  that	  infrastructure	  change	  should	  be	  based	  on	  sound	  
evidence	  and	  analysis.	  Academic	  and	  other	  expert	  research	  should	  be	  commissioned,	  
evaluated	  fairly,	  and	  used	  at	  formative	  stages	  of	  thinking	  about	  all	  significant	  reform	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59.	  See	  N.	  Watt,	  “Labour	  prepared	  to	  introduce	  judge	  quotas	  to	  achieve	  balanced	  judiciary”,	  The	  
Guardian,	  21	  April	  2004,	  p.4;	  UCL	  Constitution	  Unit,	  Monitor	  58,	  p.7.	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proposals.	  Third,	  where	  reforms	  require	  legislative	  backing	  to	  be	  implemented,	  the	  
government	  should	  publish	  bills	  and	  secondary	  legislation	  in	  draft.	  This	  will	  enable	  
parliamentary	  and	  other	  expert	  scrutiny	  of	  detailed	  proposals.	  	  
CONCLUSIONS	  
The	  British	  constitution	  provides	  high	  levels	  of	  judicial	  independence	  in	  relation	  to	  
the	  core	  functions	  of	  judges	  (hearing	  cases	  and	  writing	  judgments).	  This	  essay	  has	  
explored	  the	  constitutional	  implications	  of	  the	  “running”	  and	  “shaping”	  of	  the	  justice	  
infrastructure.	  It	  has	  been	  argued	  that	  both	  of	  these	  activities	  are	  constitutionally	  
significant.	  They	  create	  opportunities	  to	  enhance	  or	  risk	  of	  undermining	  the	  principles	  
of	  judicial	  independence,	  access	  to	  the	  courts,	  and	  the	  rule	  of	  law.	  	  
 
  
